Nevada Legal Services: The Legal Services Corporation Restrictions and the Diminishing Capacity of Access to Justice for the Poor by Ashmore, William Todd
UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones
December 2015
Nevada Legal Services: The Legal Services
Corporation Restrictions and the Diminishing
Capacity of Access to Justice for the Poor
William Todd Ashmore
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, ashmorew@unlv.nevada.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations
Part of the Law Commons, Political Science Commons, and the United States History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses, Dissertations,
Professional Papers, and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
Repository Citation
Ashmore, William Todd, "Nevada Legal Services: The Legal Services Corporation Restrictions and the Diminishing Capacity of
Access to Justice for the Poor" (2015). UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones. 2513.
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/2513
 
 
  
NEVADA LEGAL SERVICES:  THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION RESTRICTIONS  
AND THE DIMINISHING CAPACITY OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE POOR 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
William Todd Ashmore 
 
 
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration 
University of Nevada Las Vegas 
1999 
 
Master of Business Administration 
And 
Master of Science Management Information Systems 
University of Nevada Las Vegas 
2009 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the 
 
 
Master of Arts—History 
 
 
 
Department of History 
College of Liberal Arts 
The Graduate College 
 
 
 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
December 2015 
ii 
 
  
 
Thesis Approval 
The Graduate College 
The University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
        
October 12, 2015 
This thesis prepared by  
William Todd Ashmore 
entitled  
Nevada Legal Services: The Legal Services Corporation Restrictions and the Diminishing 
Capacity of Access to Justice for the Poor 
is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts -History 
Department of History 
 
                
Eugene Moehring, Ph.D.    Kathryn Hausbeck Korgan, Ph.D. 
Examination Committee Chair     Graduate College Interim Dean 
 
David Tanenhaus, Ph.D. 
Examination Committee Member 
        
Michael Green, Ph.D. 
Examination Committee Member 
 
Michael Bowers, Ph.D. 
Examination Committee Member 
 
John Schibrowsky, Ph.D. 
Graduate College Faculty Representative 
 
 iii 
 
Abstract 
 The lofty idea of equal justice for all is not the reason legal aid began in the United 
States.  Legal aid was born from the indignation over injustices committed against the poor. 
Unable to afford an attorney, the poor could not effectively assert their rights within the 
criminal and civil justice system.   Without access to justice through the courts, the extralegal 
activities required to defend oneself and exact justice such as personally forcing an employer to 
pay rightful wages, are deemed criminal in most cases.  By providing legal resources to the 
poor, legal aid not only brought order to society by preventing lawlessness, but it protected the 
rights of the poor as citizens.  The chronological history of legal services in America, from the 
first legal aid program, Der Deutsche Rechts Schutzverein in 1876, to the merger in 1964 of the 
89-year legal aid movement and the two-year old reform movement, which formed the 
federally-funded Legal Services Program (LSP) during the War on Poverty, shows the 
proliferation of legal aid societies in urban areas across the nation.     
 Under the Great Society’s Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and the LSP, legal aid 
greatly expanded with the use of discretionary government funding.  During the mid-1960s and 
early 1970s Legal Services programs showed great promise in eliminating the barriers that kept 
the poor entrenched in poverty.  With the use of national “back-up centers”, the Reginald 
Heber Smith (Reggie) program and other initiatives, legal aid programs created a nation-wide 
network designed to help the poor with more than just their legal problems.  Programs used 
class actions, legislative advocacy, and threat of attorney’s fees to reform laws and attack the 
very institutions afflicting the poor.   As the history of legal aid in America becomes more 
apparent, the LSP looks more like an aberration, especially considering the previous eighty-nine 
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years of legal aid as strictly a privately-funded affair.  Designed to fight a war on poverty, LSP 
awarded grants to the majority of established legal aid societies, but because their boards and 
directors held fast to the traditional idea of legal services they were reluctant to use law reform 
to correct injustices.  Reluctant board members, directors and those who ran the programs, in 
tandem with local bars, the unenthusiastic American Bar Association, and powerful business 
and political opponents ultimately eliminated law reform; as such, an opportunity to truly help 
the poor during the last decades of the twentieth century was lost.       
 Access to Justice is less a “right” today than it was in the 1960s.   Since the advent of the 
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) in 1974, the quality of legal services to the poor has steadily 
diminished.1  The conservative view that legal aid is a form of unnecessary welfare and 
unnecessary interference by the federal government played a dominant role in the restrictions 
placed on LSC funds during the Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich eras.  The 
"Republican Revolution" in 1996 resulted in the greatest restrictions on funding and ultimately 
ended the controversial "Support Centers" and "Reggie" program.  These restrictions reflect the 
historical concept of the “sturdy beggar” and the bygone philosophy that legal aid is a form of 
charity; as such, they work to identify and restrict the able-bodied poor from receiving any type 
of government aid, including legal services.  LSC restrictions and initiatives promote the use of 
alternative delivery methods such as Pro Bono and Pro Se that move field programs away from 
quality legal services and suggest a return to the private charity days of the first legal aid 
movement. Without quality programs that allow legal services attorneys unrestricted use of the 
                                                          
1
 Quality is defined as a fitness for purpose.  The LSC restrictions on legal aid programs diminished the capacity of 
attorneys to fully represent all poor people, making them less fit to achieve their purpose of providing legal 
services.     
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tools available to private attorneys, America’s promise of justice for all will continue to exclude 
the impoverished.  The most heinous restriction, which places LSC restrictions on non-LSC funds 
today, creates an unnecessary and expensive overlap of legal services in Nevada, making it 
more difficult to coordinate the patchwork of legal services that comprise Nevada’s make-shift 
civil Gideon.   
 The thesis includes interviews with those involved in legal aid in Nevada such as 
Supreme Court Justice Michael Douglas, Former NLS Executive Directors Carolyn Worrell and 
Wayne Pressel, Executive Director of NLS AnnaMarie Johnson, founder of Nevada Indian Legal 
Services Charles Zeh, Director of Nevada Indian Legal Services Dick Olson, and legal aid attorney 
and legislative advocate Jon Sasser.  It utilizes the early work of Reginald Heber Smith, his book 
Justice and the Poor, and former OEO Director Earl Johnson Jr’s publications, Justice and Reform 
and To Establish Justice for All, to trace the growth and atrophy of legal representation for the 
poor.  The thesis extends our knowledge by providing a more current overview of LSC with 
special emphasis on its Nevada Legal Services (NLS) program.  The thesis also complements 
Annelise Orleck’s study of Ruby Duncan and the welfare rights movement by putting legal 
services in Nevada into great historical context. 
 According to Justice Michael Douglas, there is still a group in the public which does not 
believe that legal aid is the work of a real attorney.  This group argues that legal services 
lawyers must be second-tier attorneys, because a successful first-tier attorney would never 
choose legal aid as a career.  Many of those interviewed such as Wayne Pressel, Jon Sasser and 
others are still fighting, in their own unique way, a war on poverty, an idea anathema to the 
American Bar Association, and the Legal Services Corporation today.  Not only did these legal 
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aid leaders challenge the institutions that perpetuate poverty, they refuted the idea that legal 
aid is a charity and through their work and talent disproved the second-tier attorney stigma 
that extends to the “people’s lawyer” and the legal aid profession.    
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The Legal Aid Movement  
 
Denial of justice is the short cut to anarchy. 
–Reginald Heber Smith, 1919 
Introduction 
 By the late nineteenth century, the attorney was an indispensable figure of modern life 
in America and a vital prerequisite for anyone caught up in the civil and criminal justice system.  
Those who could not afford one had the task of representing themselves in court, which was 
inadvisable, because representing oneself and navigating through changing laws and legal 
procedure usually proved impossible.  As a result, the poor rarely received justice.  The first 
legal aid societies were born out of indignation over the exploitations of the poor, usually at the 
hand of lawyers representing the opposing party.  Reformers responded to this with charity in 
the form of legal aid.  The ensuing legal aid movement and Congress at the time, considered 
legal aid to be a charitable institution; it was not considered a government responsibility.  With 
the advent of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society in the 1960s, America turned its attention to 
poverty.  Sargent Shriver’s Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) became a potential source of 
federal funds for legal aid.  Board members and directors of legal aid programs rejected the 
idea.  They argued against government involvement, holding to an eighty-nine year tradition of 
private funding.  It would take Shriver, Jean and Edgar Cahn, Lewis Powell, William McCaulpin 
and other legal aid advocates to persuade Congress, the American Bar Association (ABA) and 
the legal services programs to accept federal money.  Thus legal aid grudgingly became a 
matter of discretionary government funding and politics under the OEO Legal Services Program 
(OEO-LSP).  What the LSP was designed to do, how effective it was, and why it was ultimately 
2 
 
disbanded, depended upon whether those in need required assistance or were responsible for 
their own needs; it hardly relied upon the idea of equal justice for the poor.    
 This chapter begins with Reginald Heber Smith and his book Justice for the Poor that 
stimulated a conversation regarding equal justice for the impoverished which gained popularity 
and sparked the legal aid movement.  The chapter surveys America’s changing landscape and 
the proliferation of legal aid societies across the nation beginning with the first one, Der 
Deutsche Rechtsschutz Verein in 1876.  It traces the movement’s progress leading up to the 
formation of the federally-funded Legal Services Program launched in 1965.  A brief review of 
the landmark Gideon v. Wainwright decision and the right to an attorney in criminal matters 
will demonstrate how civil legal matters for the poor became the primary responsibility of legal 
aid.  The chapter continues by describing how poverty became more visible in the 1960s and 
how the legal aid movement attached itself to the OEO during President Johnson's "War on 
Poverty." Finally, it explains how an eighty-nine-year-old legal aid movement met a two-year-
old social reform movement to form the OEO-LSP with a dichotomous mission.   
Legal Aid Pioneer 
 According to Justice Earl Johnson Jr., “until 1920, legal aid was provided by a loose, 
unorganized collection of independent organizations located in a few of the country’s larger 
cities.” But after that, “it emerged as something that could be called a movement, with a 
measure of organization and a unifying national mission.”2  Johnson credits Reginald Heber 
Smith and his book Justice and the Poor (1919) for the movement, marking his work as “the first 
                                                          
2
 Earl Johnson Jr., Justice and Reform: The Formative Years of the OEO Legal Services Program (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1974), 5. 
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definitive treatment of inequality in the administration of justice.”3  Using case histories, 
statistics, and potent language, Smith dispelled the myth that equal justice existed.  “The 
American justice system is not impartial, and the rich and poor do not stand on equality before 
the law,”4 Smith avowed, "for the State to erect an uneven, partial administration of justice is 
to abnegate the very responsibility for which it exists."5   
 To Smith, delay and costs denied justice to the poor.  The time taken to receive final 
judgment made it impractical to sue, and costs incurred for a host of services made litigation 
unaffordable.6  Moreover, without proper representation, cases devolved into one-sided 
arguments, wasting the court’s time.  Smith urged simplified procedure, efficient 
reorganization, and unification of the courts to help eliminate delay and to lower costs. For the 
cost of counsel, he offered three solutions: attempt Pro Se by “representing one’s self”, make 
the attorney’s services unnecessary, and/or provide assistance of counsel for those who could 
not afford one.  Thus, the essence of early legal aid work was to provide legal advice and 
assistance to the poor through free representation, a service the courts vitally needed.     
  Smith published his book at an opportune time in America.  The beginning of World 
War I promised a “world safe for democracy”, but its end brought myriad labor strikes and 
social turbulence, including virulent racism.  The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia spawned 
                                                          
3
 Johnson, 5. 
4
 Reginald Heber Smith, Justice and the Poor, a Study of the Present Denial of Justice to the Poor and of the 
Agencies Making More Equal Their Position before the Law, with Particular Reference to Legal Aid Work in the 
United States (New York: The Carnegie Foundation, 1919), 8. 
5
 Ibid., 5. 
6
  Delay and costs often denied justice to the poor.  In one case over a wage claim the final judgment took one 
year, nine months and eleven days.  Fortunately, the judge ruled in favor of the wage-earner to collect a week’s 
worth of wages owed, approximately $10.00.  Costs and fee schedules differed from state to state and from court 
to court, [Appellate, Supreme etc.] and fees were often incurred for a range of services including, docketing, filing, 
searching and obtaining records, certifying or copying documents, and general processing.  Smith suggested an all-
inclusive in forma pauperis statute, similar to that in the federal courts. 
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growing fears over the spread of a godless communism and anarchism.  At home, Socialist Party 
candidate Eugene V. Debs attracted nearly a million votes in the presidential election of 1920.  
The migration of families of Eastern European immigrants only exacerbated WASP fears about 
class revolution, leading to quota acts in 1921 and 1924 that were not lifted until the Great 
Society in 1966.  All of these events impelled US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer to enlist 
the support of a young J. Edgar Hoover to conduct “Red Raids” to restore America to normalcy.  
Against this backdrop of fear, of communism and socialism, Smith’s voice warned that “when 
the law recognizes and enforces a distinction between classes, revolution ensues or democracy 
is at an end.”7  Without access to justice for the poor, faith in democracy would fail.   Smith, a 
bellwether of justice for the poor, capitalized on present fears while harnessing an opportunity 
for Americans to take action.   Provide justice for all, he urged, if you don’t want anarchy.   
The Need for Legal Aid 
 American philosopher, Ralph Waldo Emerson, wrote in 1841, “A good indignation brings 
out all of one’s powers.”8  Smith believed that legal aid societies sprang, not from loftier ideas 
of a right to justice, but from plain indignation.  In 1876, Der Deutsche Rechtsschutz Verein, the 
German Legal Aid Society in New York, hired an attorney to protect its immigrants from 
“runners, boarding-house keepers, and a miscellaneous coterie of sharpers who found that the 
trustful and bewildered newcomers offered an easy prey.”  The first of its kind, the society 
provided “legal aid and assistance, gratuitously, to those…who from poverty are unable to 
                                                          
7
 Johnson, 6. 
8
 Ralph Waldo Emerson, 24 October 1841, Journal XXXII, From (From Journals E, G, H, and J),  
The Ralph Waldo Emerson Journals Digital Archive, Volume 6 [From the 1904-14 Edition, Edward Emerson, General 
Editor], presented by The Ralph Waldo Emerson Institute and RWE.org. 
http://www.perfectidius.com/Volume_6_1842-1844.pdf 
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procure it.”9 Eight years later, The Protective Agency for Women and Children opened in 
Chicago, to protect women and children against “the great number of seductions and 
debaucheries…under the guise of proffered employment.”10   Earl Johnson credits the Agency 
with establishing the need to provide legal help for the poor in Chicago, because in 1888, only 
four years later, the Bureau of Justice, the first true legal aid society, opened its doors to people 
of any nationality or gender.   
Smith reasoned that Der Deutsche Rechtsschutz Verein, The Protective Agency for 
Women and Children, and the Chicago Bureau were born out of indignation over the lack of 
legal protection for the poor, without which placed the power of law “in the hands of their 
oppressors.”11  How much power the oppressors possessed or how many seductions or 
debaucheries were averted by these new protective agencies is unclear.  What is clear is 
whether it was a response to the abuses of the legal process by those who could afford 
attorneys or the current civil and criminal justice system’s failure to protect the poor, early 
societies recognized that justice for the poor could no longer be realized without an attorney. 
The German Society, Woman’s Club, and Chicago Ethical Cultural Society were the first to 
recognize the need for legal aid.   
America’s Changing Landscape 
By 1880, New York City, home of Der Rechtsschutz Verein, passed one million residents.  
The engine of American industry acted like a magnet to millions of foreign people looking for 
opportunity. From 1880 to 1920, US commercial growth garnered what labor it could from the 
                                                          
9
 Smith, 135. 
10
Earl Johnson Jr., Justice and Reform: The Formative Years of the OEO Legal Services Program (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1974), 4. 
11
 Smith, 9. 
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able-bodied men, women, and children comprising 23 million immigrants.  The influx of 
newcomers, including the mass migration of rural people to industrial areas, led to urban crises.  
By 1920, America reached a turning point when, for the first time, more Americans lived in 
cities than in rural areas.  This segmented, decentralized America, described by Robert Wiebe 
as, “a nation of loosely connected islands,”12 with small-towns as the norm, was disappearing.  
Frantic urbanization and industrialization turned many towns into cities and displaced 
traditional communities.  According to Lawrence Friedman, “the small face-to-face 
communities grew larger and became societies of strangers…the demands of economic 
rationality and the need for predictability and certainty asserted their claims.”13  More formality 
meant more rules.  According to Smith, the attorney was critical in navigating the legal system 
for justice:  
With the great cities came the infinite complexity of modern life, of business, and of 
affairs in general which breed litigation.  The law itself became highly complicated. With 
thirteen thousand decisions of courts of last resort being made each year and twelve 
thousand laws annually enacted by the legislatures, no man could determine his rights 
without employing attorneys.14   
 
Smith contended that the right to justice based on a government of laws was the 
cornerstone of the republic, because the rights of every individual, their life, liberty, property, 
and character depended on it.  From New York’s Bill of Rights mandating that “Neither justice 
nor right should be sold to any person, nor denied,” 15 to the Illinois Constitution, avowing that 
“Every person… ought to obtain right and justice freely,”16 legal aid provided requisite attorneys 
                                                          
12
 Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967), 4. 
13
 Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 31. 
14
 Smith, 7. 
15
 Part I, Declaration of Rights, Article VI. 
16
 IL, Constitution Article VIII, Section 12. 
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to safeguard America’s guarantee of a right to justice.  Were legal aid societies simply a 
response to America’s chaotic transformation?  Certainly they developed more from necessity 
than from missionary work. The sheer number of laws enacted and court decisions issued are 
the justice system’s attempt to fashion law and create order out of America’s changing 
landscape.  Confusion and complication of law and procedure were the byproducts of the need 
to create order.  The attorney was now more important than ever; and, with the poor’s growing 
inability to afford one, the fight was fixed against them.   
Legal Aid Evolves 
 Smith argued for essential counsel, holding that high demand for help made the old 
solution of legal aid undesirable.  The days of the kind lawyer taking a case were gone—a relic 
of the nineteenth century.  Historian Richard Hofstadter noted the change at the turn of the 
century as corporations began to monopolize the legal profession, making it increasingly 
difficult for the proverbial country lawyer to make a living.17  In 1905, Louis Brandeis declared 
that “instead of holding a position of independence, between the wealthy and the people, 
prepared to curb the excesses of either, able lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed 
themselves to become adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected to use their powers 
for the protection of the people.”18 In larger cities, Smith held “charities, churches, bar 
associations, women’s clubs and the like found themselves confronted with the pressing 
problem of how to obtain justice for poor persons who came to their attention.”19 
                                                          
17
 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 156-164. 
18
 Louis Brandeis addresses the Harvard Ethical Society at Phillips Brooks House on May, 4, 1905.  Louis D. 
Brandeis, “The Opportunity in the Law,” The American Law Review 39 (July-August, 1905): 559. 
19
 Smith, 140. 
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 In response, new legal aid societies, modeled after New York, reproduced in kind to 
answer the rising problems associated with urbanization: Boston Legal Aid Society (1900), New 
Jersey Legal Aid Association (1901), Legal Aid Society of Philadelphia (1902), Cleveland Legal Aid 
Society (1904), and the Legal Aid Dispensary of Denver (1904).  In 1905, the Bureau of Justice 
and Protective Agency merged to become the Chicago Legal Aid Society.  By 1909, all of the 
larger cities in the East offered some type of legal aid work.  From the East to the Midwest, and 
into the Pacific Northwest and Southwest regions, legal aid spread across urban America with 
Legal Aid Bureau of Baltimore (1911), Legal Aid Society of Rochester (1911); and similar 
organizations in Kansas City in 1910, St. Louis, Akron and St. Paul in 1912, and Duluth, 
Minneapolis and Louisville in 1913.20  By 1913, there were twenty-eight legal aid organizations.  
The term “legal aid” became synonymous with such organizations, noted Smith, and “the 
phrase…came to carry a clear connotation of safety and relief to the minds of the poor.”21 
 To be sure this process was but another aspect of American “progressive reform,” which 
began in the big cities in the 1880s, slowly spread to the states, and by 1901 to the Federal 
Government with Theodore Roosevelt as president.  Innovations such as the Legal Aid Review 
(1903) and Legal Aid Alliance helped promote interest and financial support and encouraged 
the sharing of vital resources among societies.22  Indeed, the Alliance helped form a clearing 
house whereby cases were transferred from one city to be handled in another.  Further 
developments involved the Association of the Bar of the City of Detroit, which established and 
                                                          
20
 Smith, 145. 
21
 In 1896, Der Deutsche Rechtsschutz Verein changed its name to the New York Legal Aid society.  After “Boston 
Legal Aid Society” adopted the nomenclature in 1900, the term “legal aid” became the uniform way to describe 
such organizations.  Smith, 138. 
22
 The Review provided interesting stories on client cases and notes on the significance and development of legal 
aid work. 
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supported a legal aid office in 1909, making it the first such organization to join the movement. 
Kansas City, in particular, took legal aid out of the realm of charity and placed it under a 
department of municipal government, the Board of Public Welfare.  The city paid for legal aid 
expenses through its public treasury.  By doing so, the City of Fountains “put the ideal of the 
fundamental law into practice and saw that no one was denied justice because of inability to 
employ counsel.”23   
 By 1917 there were forty-one societies including ones in San Francisco, Milwaukee, 
Columbus, Nashville, Plainfield, Richmond, and San Diego.24  Four public defender organizations 
provided criminal representation, while two offered both civil and criminal.  The Los Angeles 
Defender’s Office (1914) and its counterparts in St. Louis, Dayton, Dallas (1915), Portland, OR, 
and Omaha (1916) took on civil cases.  Notable legal aid developments included a student-
supported legal aid society established by George Washington and Yale University law schools, 
and the “The Voluntary Defenders Committee” (1917) in New York, which provided legal aid 
work in the criminal field.   
Legal aid societies responded to the growing need for attorneys.  “The most important 
fact,” held Smith “is that the prevailing type of organization shifted to that of the publicly 
controlled, publicly supported bureau.”25 Public involvement of legal aid, involving both civil 
and criminal matters, transformed the movement by challenging the idea that it was a charity—
rather, legal aid was a reputable, proven, and integral part of the administration of justice.   
                                                          
23
 Smith, 146. 
24
 Ibid., 148. 
25
 Ibid., 148.  According to Smith, “Up to 1910, of the fourteen societies that attained permanence, ten were 
organized as private charitable corporations.  From 1910 through 1913, of the fourteen societies that lasted, eight 
came into being as departments of organized charities”, 145.  
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The Legal Aid Movement 
 Smith startled the officials of the American Bar Association (ABA) when he suggested 
sending copies of his controversial book to all attorneys.  In response, the ABA refused to send 
him its membership list.  Ultimately, interest from ABA leaders, such as Charles Evans Hughes, 
led to an entire session devoted to legal aid at the 43rd Annual Convention of the ABA (1920).  
Notable speakers such as Hughes, a past and future Supreme Court Justice, and Judge Ben 
Lindsey, a pioneer in the establishment of the Denver juvenile court system, addressed poverty 
and the administration of justice.  The director of the Philadelphia Welfare Department, Ernest 
Tustin, made the case for a legal aid bureau:  
To investigate and prevent impositions upon the poor and ignorant and to furnish a 
proper and rational defense for men, women and children without means is just as 
much an obligation as to fill the office of district attorney for the prosecution of crime or 
to provide a city solicitor to enforce health mandates and building restrictions.26  
 
 The session ended with the creation of a Special Committee on Legal Aid.  By 1923, the 
National Association of Legal Aid Organizations (NALAO) succeeded the National Alliance of 
Legal Aid Societies.  The NALAO later became the National Legal Aid and Defender Association 
(NLADA).27 Smith’s call for a national legal aid organization had been answered. 
By the 1930s resources for legal aid more than doubled with the addition of thirty new 
legal aid organizations, but the decade would be dominated by growing concerns over the 
Great Depression.  With businesses trimming costs, the legal profession was often the first 
service to be cut.   As corporate bankruptcies increased and many individuals went broke, 
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private attorneys and members of the ABA grew concerned over the diminishing number of 
clients.  Self-preservation took precedence over charitable legal aid.  Hard times only resulted in 
growing caseloads for legal aid organizations.  Unable to keep pace with demand in times of 
prosperity, financial support for legal aid decreased as caseloads increased.  During the first 
three years of the Depression the workload almost doubled from 171,000 new cases in 1929 to 
307,000 in 1932.28  Afterward and throughout the decade, cases declined.  Underfunded legal 
aid societies could no longer meet demand in a timely and reasonable manner; as a result of 
these delays, many clients simply gave up.   
 During the 1940s and 1950s, legal services continued their expansion. In 1949, 
approximately fifty-seven percent of large cities housed a legal aid office; by 1959 the number 
rose to seventy-nine. The development of new legal aid societies was no easy task: almost all 
societies required the support of local bar associations.  Emery Brownell, staff leader of the 
NLADA explained the difficulty of garnering that support:  
Whether due to unfounded fear of competition, inherent lethargy, or mere lack of 
interest, the failure of local bar associations to give leadership, and in many cases the 
hostility of lawyers to the idea, have been formidable stumbling blocks in the efforts to 
establish needed facilities.29 
 
Legal aid leaders found that eloquent speeches on morality and equal access to justice did little 
to entice apathetic or hostile state bar associations; rather, documentation, in writing, of the 
practical advantages of legal aid won their hearts.  Winning arguments held that legal aid filters 
out non-paying clients, and keeps them out of private lawyers’ offices.  Moreover, by securing 
back wages for discharged employees and support funds for abandoned women, legal aid 
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societies kept people off the relief roles.  Legal aid also educated people about the value and 
necessity of lawyers, which increased future business for private practitioners.  Finally, legal aid 
was not only a training ground for young lawyers, but established a better public image of the 
bar with the general public.  
 The largest boost for legal aid in the U.S. came in 1950 from a foreign source when the 
British Parliament funded its Legal Aid and Advice Scheme.  Great Britain’s government-funded 
legal aid system smacked  of socialism at a time when the second wave of the Red Scare and 
McCarthyism left Americans, once again, concerned about and fearful of communism and 
socialist programs.  At the time, the average lawyer looked askance at a federal program for 
legal aid.  “To me, the greatest threat aside from the undermining influence of Communist 
infiltration,” said former ABA president Robert G. Storey, “is the propaganda campaign for a 
federal subsidy to finance a nationwide plan for legal aid and low-cost legal service…”30 Storey 
likened the minority Lawyer’s Guild, which pushed for such a campaign, to the minority 
organized by Hitler and Lenin to secure their revolutions.  The ABA condemned any government 
role in legal aid.  Orison Marden, President of the NLADA, saw private legal aid as a protective 
measure against socialism and government control of the legal profession.  In response, many 
states and local bars began to support private legal aid societies.  Johnson refers to the fact that 
“In an earlier time—the 1930s, for instance—proponents of legal aid might have embraced the 
opportunity to obtain government funds.  But the rhetoric and experience of the 1950s had 
turned leaders of the legal aid movement completely away.”31   
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By the 1960s the legal aid movement still could not meet the demand for its services.  
Funding was exclusively private with the majority of funds coming from community chests 
(60%) and bar associations (15%) and the remainder from campaigns and Pro Bono.  “There was 
almost no governmental support—federal, state or local—,” said Johnson, “and a philosophical 
preference among the members of legal aid societies that things remain the same.”32  The ABA 
and NLADA remained reluctant to use federal funding.  According to Johnson, even with 
comparative prosperity, total funding for legal aid in 1962 was less than $4 million.  This 
equated to four hundred full-time lawyers serving fifty million Americans or one lawyer per 
120,000 persons, resulting in underpaid staff attorneys with unrealistic caseloads.   
Right to an Attorney 
 Until Gideon v. Wainwright guaranteed legal representation in the criminal context, the 
scales of justice were unfairly stacked against poor persons charged with a felony crime.33  
Beforehand, the right to counsel surfaced in only a few Supreme Court cases.  In 1938, in 
Johnson v. Zerbst, the US Supreme Court reaffirmed Amendment VI of the US Constitution 
which guaranteed the rights of criminal defendants to a speedy trial, impartial jury, notice of 
accusation, and “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense.”34   
  As early as 1853, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Webb v. Baird, (6 Ind. 13) recognized a 
right to an attorney for criminal defendants.  However, the right was based on "the principles of 
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a civilized society," rather than constitutional law.  According to the NLADA today, “The right to 
counsel in federal proceedings was well-established by statute early in the country’s history… 
The Webb v. Baird decision however, was the exception rather than the rule in the states.”35  In 
1932, in the Scottsboro Case, the Court held that defendants were entitled to an attorney in 
State capital cases.  In the opinion, Justice George Sutherland strongly supported the need for 
an attorney,  
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the 
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman…requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though 
he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence.36 
  
 The Court’s view suggested a possible extension of Sixth Amendment rights to states in 
the future.  However, ten years later in Betts v. Brady (1942) the Court chose not to extend 
those rights.  Although Justice Owen Roberts and others recognized a need for counsel, Roberts 
was “unable to say that the concept of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment 
obligates the States…to furnish counsel in every such case,” he argued that, “the states should 
not be strait-jacketed in this respect."37    
 The Warren Court believed that the right to counsel in criminal cases was “so 
fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory 
upon the States."38  Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) overruled Betts v. Brady.  The decision 
emphasized the fact that governments which spent large amounts of money to try defendants 
and defendants, who spent large amounts of money to hire the best attorneys, considered the 
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aid of a lawyer absolutely necessary.  In delivering the opinion, Justice Hugo Black asserted, 
“The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential 
to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”39 
  The Gideon decision required that all governments, federal, state and local, provide 
public legal counsel in all criminal cases.  As a result, states began expanding their role in the 
representation of indigent defendants with public defenders.  Until 1963, other than the rare 
public defenders in the larger cities, the poor relied on either volunteer or Pro Bono attorneys 
or no one at all.   
 Gideon only offered the American poor the right to counsel in felony cases.  
Consequently, in civil matters such as unlawful evictions, wage claims, child custody, etc., the 
poor relied on underfunded and exclusively private legal aid programs unable to meet demand.  
By 1962, only five municipal legal aid bureaus existed, four fewer than in 1919, and seven fewer 
than in 1932.40  With less than $4 million in total funding for legal aid programs, legal services 
leaders and others began looking for government help.  The Kennedy Administration at the 
time pushed for increases in social security benefits and other anti-poverty legislation, but it 
was not until Johnson’s administration and a desire to eradicate increasingly visible poverty, 
that more substantial funding came in the form of the OEO.   
Poverty Becomes Visible 
 According to historian James T. Patterson, “[The] shift of poverty to the North and the 
cities was the most significant change in modern American history.  By the mid-1960s it helped 
make poverty visible again and facilitated community organization and political pressure from 
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the poor.”41  Continued immigration and business cycles only enlarged the indigent population 
in America’s cities.  Technological advancements in agriculture, specifically the mechanical 
cotton picker in 1943, eventually displaced over 2.3 million family farm workers in the South, 
resulting in a net loss of 2.2 million inhabitants in the 1940s and 1.4 million in the 1950s.42 
Migration to urban areas resulted in noticeable areas of poverty.  Discrimination and racism 
exacerbated urban poverty.  Civil rights activist Walter White of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) noted that “between 1935 and 1950, while 
approximately 2,761,000 dwelling units were built under the FHA insurance program, no more 
that 50,000 of them were available to nonwhites.”43 Discrimination by the FHA on economic 
grounds denied loans to blacks and other minorities looking to live in better areas.  Restrictive 
covenants, redlining, blockbusting, and white flight created predominantly poor black 
neighborhoods and perpetuated the spiralling cycle of decreasing property values, 
underfunded schools, lack of education, growing unemployment, rising crime, and increased 
incarcerations.44  White middle class city residents fled to the suburbs to escape these 
problems as well as congestion, increasing numbers of minorities, rising taxes, and other issues.  
By 1960 fifty-five percent of America’s poor lived in cities and thirty percent in small towns.  
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The extent of poverty had become visible as the rest of the nation enjoyed affluence and a 
rising standard of living. 
 Postwar social scientists knew surprisingly little about poverty.  Due to the prosperity of 
the 1940s and 1950s, poverty-related research and publication had hardly advanced.  The 
postwar return to prosperity led many middle class white Americans to forget the Great 
Depression and return to the boundless optimism of the 1920s.  Now with social security and 
other safeguards, the cultural mindset believed a strong economy would pull most of the needy 
out of poverty and end the need for welfare.   Some optimism was not unfounded, as economic 
growth steadily lowered the percentage of those living below or at the government’s poverty 
line.  Based on economist Herman Miller’s definition of a minimum subsistence or a life of 
“decency and health,” poverty “rose from 40 percent in 1929 to 48 percent (61 million people) 
in 1935-1936 and then fell steadily to 33 percent (44 million) in 1940, 27 percent (41 million) in 
1950, and 21 percent (more than 39 million) in 1960.”45  Average personal income also 
increased from $3,343 in 1936 and $5,150 in 1946, to $6,193 in 1960.   Still, by the 1950s, 
despite increases in personal income and decreases in the percentage of poverty, a multitude 
of social problems remained; nearly 40 million people, or one-fifth of the American population 
were impoverished, with a growing number of urban poor.46  
War on Poverty 
 “By the early 1960s,” Patterson held, “reformers echoed Herbert Hoover and the 
optimists of the 1920s in assuming poverty was un-American and could be abolished.”47  But 
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Michael Harrington’s 1962 bestseller, The Other America, claimed otherwise.  Harrington found 
“new,” hard-core poverty in America, comprised of old people, female-headed households and 
minorities.  “Tens of millions of Americans are, at this very moment, maimed in body and spirit, 
existing at levels beneath those necessary for human decency,” stressed Harrington, “If these 
people are not starving, they are hungry, and sometimes fat with hunger, for that is what cheap 
foods do.  They are without adequate housing and education and medical care.”48   This 
perpetual culture of poverty would not be easily abolished.   
 Harrington’s book inspired Lyndon B. Johnson, who as president implemented a “War 
on Poverty,” following the death of JFK.  With 30 years in public life, a network of allies, a liberal 
majority in Congress and a visible poverty, Johnson asked the country in 1964 to build a “Great 
Society” and join in the “War.”  Johnson sought a program that would fulfill every American’s 
basic hopes,  
his hopes for a fair chance to make good; his hopes for fair play from the law; his hopes 
for a full-time job on full-time pay; his hopes for a decent home for his family in a decent 
community; his hopes for a good school for his children with good teachers; and his 
hopes for security when faced with sickness or unemployment or old age.49   
 
 In response, Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act, which created the Office of 
Economic Opportunity (OEO).  In turn, the OEO created the Community Action Program (CAP) 
to fund local community-based anti-poverty programs also known as Community Action 
Agencies (CAA).  All types of proposals were eligible for CAP funding, with millions of federal 
dollars available.  “It was as if the task force, lacking time to draft creative legislation,” Earl 
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Johnson said, “hoped that creativity would surge during the implementation stage of the act.”50   
CAP offered opportunities for both new programs with new ideas, and much-needed money for 
established programs.   Under the leadership of Director R. Sargent Shriver, the OEO funded 
multiple programs such as Head Start, Job Corps, Domestic Peace Corps and the Legal Services 
Program, which, modeled after the Neighborhood Lawyer Programs, offered a new approach to 
legal aid designed to fight a war on poverty.     
Neighborhood Lawyer Programs 
 The lessons learned from the early failures and later successes of the neighborhood 
lawyer programs helped develop the model for President Johnson’s Legal Services Program 
(LSP).  Sharing a commitment to reducing poverty, these programs embraced different 
philosophies and used various approaches in social reform.  According to Earl Johnson, “they 
were after something more palpable than procedural due process.”51 For example, under a 
Ford Foundation grant, the Community Progress, Inc. (CPI)52, in New Haven, Connecticut, 
offered a decentralized approach to social rescue. The plan involved a team of social workers 
and lawyers to “diagnose, refer, and coordinate the legal problems of the poor.”53  The New 
Haven proposal sought to fix the clients’ psychological, social, and or educational deficiencies 
with the goal of helping them become more self-sufficient and partake of the nation’s 
affluence.  Unfortunately, CPI had little opportunity to succeed.  A controversial rape case 
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involving a young black defendant created a negative backlash.54  Seven weeks later, after 
pressure from local residents and community leaders, CPI suspended its services.  Although 
never funded, a second New Haven proposal influenced the model of LSP with its focus on 
poverty and the idea that the lawyer and legal activities would be coordinated with a wide 
variety of community services.   
 In a similar decentralized approach, the Mobilization for Youth (MFY),55 in New York’s 
lower East Side, offered another approach to law reform.  Influenced by social welfare planner 
Elizabeth Wickenden, Director Edward Sparer used lawsuits and test cases to challenge the 
welfare system.   The New York proposal sought to change the rules and practices that divert 
funds away from the poor class.  MFY almost suffered a similar fate as CPI.56  Due to MFY’s 
controversial test cases which included attacks on the Welfare Department, the latter withdrew 
its support and pressured representatives of other public agencies on MFY’s board to 
investigate the legal unit.  The Welfare Commissioner and Deputy Administrator Henry Cohn 
complained that lawyers were jeopardizing relationships vital to MFY’s overall purpose.  This 
behavior, they argued, did not promote the cooperative effort envisioned in the proposal.  
Marvin Frankel, Chairman of the Faculty Advisory Committee of MFY’s legal unit, convinced the 
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Board that interference by officers or lay members regarding a lawyer’s conduct of a case was 
prohibited.57  Moreover, the Canon of Legal Ethics protected the client-lawyer relationship from 
such violations.  The MFY Committee on Direct Operations agreed.  MFY was saved.  More 
importantly, the board of MFY permanently recognized the independence of the program’s 
lawyers.   
 In May 1964, in a large anti-poverty effort, the United Planning Organization (UPO), 
(formed by the Ford Foundation to undertake broad missions) established three neighborhood 
service centers in Washington DC.  UPO wanted lawyers to demonstrate the synergistic effects 
of teamwork.58  Some poor, they believed, only talked to lawyers because talking with social 
workers and psychologists implied illness or weakness.  In any case, UPO looked to add legal 
services to its new Neighborhood Legal Services Program (NLSP).  Learning from New Haven 
and MFY, NLSP chose a separate board of local lawyers to decentralize and insulate it from 
direct controversy.  The board established criteria for certain cases and referred others to other 
legal services programs.  The program provided specialized legal assistance and worked with 
other organizations and disciplines.  It pursued two major goals: establish unmet legal needs 
and therefore justify NLSP’s existence, and “rescue” or lift individuals and families out of 
poverty.59   
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 In July, 1964, Jean and Edgar Cahn published “The War on Poverty: A Civilian 
Perspective”.  The Cahn Thesis, as it was known, analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the 
neighborhood lawyer programs and suggested a new type of firm with a “Civilian Perspective.”  
This thesis proposed the use of Community Action Agencies (CAAs) comprised of local private 
and public non-profit organizations.  To be more responsive to poor residents’ needs, boards 
included some as members, the idea being that, poor persons could better identify the needs of 
the poor.  At a minimum, the agency would have someone providing a voice from the 
impoverished.  The “Civilian Perspective” addressed the concerns of the New Haven and New 
York programs over lawyers being subordinate to social workers, and clients being subordinate 
to lawyers.  “The concept,” held Johnson, “would serve as the powerful voice through which a 
local poverty community would exert influence over the agencies responsible for distributing 
income and opportunity to that community.”60  
 Thus, the Legal Services Program embodied ideas about, and the lessons learned from, 
the neighborhood lawyer experiments.  LSP required that representatives of the poor, or low-
income members, sit on the boards of local programs [Cahn Thesis on Citizen Participation].  
The programs would work with organizations helping the poor [CPI & NLSP].  Lawyers would 
represent clients in all areas of law, excluding criminal defense.  And LSP programs would 
participate in reforming regulations, statutes, and administrative practices [MFY].  
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Connection to Poverty 
 How did legal services become part of the “War on Poverty”?  The connection of legal 
services to the OEO began with Jean and Edgar Cahn.61  The Cahn Thesis and Edgar’s speech-
writing ability allowed him to work with Shriver’s top aide Adam Yarmolinsky, and ultimately 
work as a key assistant to Shriver.  When Shriver created a special task force to “assess the 
potential role that lawyers might play in the antipoverty effort,”62 the members consisted 
largely of the Cahns’ original creative group.  The Cahns and others convincingly argued that 
legal aid was a vital part of the War on Poverty.  The Thesis advised that “Wars require 
recruitment, mobilization, internal discipline, a careful assessment of objectives, and a 
comprehensive strategy for victory.  The War on Poverty is no exception.”63 Lawyers were ideal 
combatants for this war.  They were well-equipped for all the intricacies of social organization.  
By working with lawyers, the poor felt empowered.  “There is no self-demeaning implication,” 
the Cahns held, “or taint of helplessness and internal confusion in requesting the services of an 
attorney.”64 Further argument concluded that due to the nature of the profession, lawyers did 
not have to be apologetic about class status.  They did not have to be “one of them.”  Lawyers 
were also in the business of suing for redress of grievances.  They had the power to exact a 
response from reluctant public officials, welfare institutions, private service agencies, local 
businesses and more.  Furthermore, the advocacy orientation of the profession allowed the 
lawyer to act independently of the pressures of the institution they worked for.  Due to the 
“case-oriented” nature of legal aid, lawyers could also identify real problems.  This was a 
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positive contradiction to organizations articulating the problems themselves.  Last but not least, 
the poor needed legal help.    
Many of the problems faced by slum dwellers are either legal in nature or have legal 
dimensions.  Divorce, eviction, welfare frauds, coerced confessions, arrest, police 
brutality, narcotics convictions, installment buying—all involve legal problems, at least 
by the time a crisis arises.  Further, nothing destroys the momentum of a militant 
community effort more than alleged technicalities of law or the alleged statutory 
inability of an official to redress a grievance.65   
 
 In the end, the OEO and the powers that be, agreed that a concerted, comprehensive 
attack on the sources of poverty must include legal problems among the economic, educational 
and psychological problems of the poor.    
The Movement and Poverty 
 The social reform movement consisting of the Ford Foundation-funded Neighborhood 
Lawyer Programs was a separate movement from the legal aid movement involving the 
hundreds of legal aid societies.  Boards and Directors of legal aid societies felt no fault and 
shared little guilt in the existence of poverty, defining legal aid as an ameliorant rather than a 
cure.  They were not insensitive, but they failed to make a direct connection between denial of 
justice and economic inequality.  They were also leery of federal money and saw no connection 
with its services and the OEO’s goal of eliminating poverty.  At first, members of the ABA and 
NLADA, (associated with the legal aid movement) were unwilling to endorse the OEO Legal 
Services Program (OEO-LSP).   
  Lewis Powell, President of the ABA, foresaw that Great Society funding for legal aid 
would happen.  In response, Powell, with help from Chairman William McCalpin and others, 
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managed to secure an ABA resolution endorsing the OEO.66  The endorsement seemed 
mutually beneficial.  The ABA, through influential roles in policymaking, would meet its 
responsibility and become a leader in making legal services available to all who needed them, 
and the OEO would leverage the ABA’s national “muscle” to help promote its own agenda.  One 
must remember that, as Earl Johnson noted, at the time “the concept of prepackaged so-called 
‘National Emphasis’ program [such as Headstart and Upward bound] was still unknown to the 
nascent war on poverty.”67   
 By 1964 there were two distinct legal assistance movements in the US.  The 89-year-old 
legal aid movement consisted mostly of established middle-aged lawyers and was financed by 
charity at approximately $4 million a year.  The ideal driving this movement was equal access to 
justice.  The other movement, financed by the Ford Foundation and federal funds, was only two 
years old.  The younger lawyers who spearheaded this movement were more concerned with 
social reform.  Their efforts in fighting poverty aligned with President Johnson’s 1964 State of 
the Union Address that declared: “Our aim is not only to relieve the symptom of poverty, but to 
cure it and, above all, to prevent it.”  Within 18 months, with the ABA endorsement, the two 
movements became one crusade that led to a federal program of legal assistance to the poor, 
the OEO-LSP.   
  As part of the war on poverty, the two movements merged to become the Legal 
Services Program under the Community Action Program of the OEO.  Thus, OEO-LSP was born 
from two separate movements with different missions.  The new board of LSP would have to 
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prioritize its goals:  to provide equal access to justice and due process for low-income 
Americans, and seek social change through law reform.    
Summary 
 As noted earlier, the landmark decision of Gideon v. Wainwright guaranteed the right to 
counsel, but only under “special circumstances,” cases involving felony charges.  Civil and non-
felony criminal matters were not included.  Justice Tom Clark, who upheld the Gideon decision, 
concurred, “There is no reason to apply that protection in certain cases but not others.”68  Born 
out of indignation, and throughout its progressive proliferation, legal aid from its earliest days 
provided the right to counsel for civil matters, but only as a matter of charity.  In 1965, the 
Great Society uprooted that idea by providing federal funding for legal aid.   
 The OEO employed a comprehensive approach to combating poverty.  Many legal 
services reformers saw an opportunity for the creation of a federal program for legal aid within 
this comprehensive structure; and by 1965, the Legal Services Program was launched with a 
dichotomous mission: to provide equal access to justice and fight in the “War on Poverty.”  
American statesman Elihu Root had long declared “it is the proper function of government to 
secure justice, in a broad sense that is the chief thing for which government is organized.”69  88 
years after Der Deutsche Rechtsschutz Verein, the U.S. government formed the OEO-LSP and 
the nation finally took a step toward securing that justice.  
 Concerned about the federal government’s growth, many Republicans, especially 
conservatives have attacked the LSP—seeing the federally-funded program as a form of 
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welfare—it was anathema to many voters and politicians.  Thus the argument over the LSP was 
largely related to the idea of welfare and to the traditional view that legal aid should remain a 
private charity institution.  LSP’s tumultuous history is filled with conservative and occasionally 
liberal opposition, especially when LSP-funded programs engaged in law reform.  
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The Legal Services Program 
It is one thing to rhapsodize about new, vague approaches at pleasant luncheon meetings.  It is another 
to make tough choices and alienate powerful people in order to implement your rhetoric.   
–Earl Johnson Jr., 1974 
Introduction 
 The Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO-LSP) was 
designed to provide equal justice for the poor and attack poverty through law reform.  The idea 
of “law reform” was never fully accepted by the legal aid societies, the American Bar 
Association (ABA), the National Legal Aid Defenders Association (NLADA) or local bar 
associations across the nation.  The deadlines imposed by the federal government to spend 
funds forced the OEO-LSP administration to offer grants without fully vetting their recipients.  
Thus government funds designed to attack poverty through holistic efforts were primarily used 
to fund the early legal aid societies and their primary mission of legal representation. The OEO-
LSP enjoyed some early success in promoting law reform, but the controversy LSP-funded 
programs created, threatened the entire program.  Law reform was the last straw for many 
conservative members of Congress who believed legal aid was a charity.  It was one thing for 
the government to provide funds for equal justice for the poor, but quite another to attack the 
prevailing system on their behalf.  It was particularly controversial when legal aid advocates 
questioned government authority or attacked businesses that supported political campaigns.  
Consequently, powerful opponents began working toward curtailing law reform and eliminating 
the OEO-LSP altogether. The OEO-LSP history foreshadowed the ongoing struggle the future 
Legal Services Corporation (LSC) would have by championing LSP's philosophy of reform.  Since 
29 
 
its creation in 1974, LSC has become a product of compromise in Congress and a program of 
increasing regulations affecting the poor’s access to justice.     
 This chapter covers the mission of the OEO-LSP and the funding of legal services 
programs across the nation.  It describes how the OEO-LSP attempted to promote law reform, 
how it found independence, and how law reform ultimately created controversy and powerful 
opponents.  Finally, the chapter addresses the end of the OEO-LSP and the decline of law 
reform—considered by many liberals the greatest weapon in the fight against poverty.  After 
these events, Legal Services lawyers would never experience a more favorable environment to 
“dismantle the inequalities that kept the poor entrenched in poverty.”70 
OEO-LSP 
  On September 24, 1964 E. Clinton Bamberger Jr. became the first Legal Services 
Director.71   He soon chose Earl Johnson Jr. as his deputy.  Johnson is a key figure in LSP history, 
because he later became the director and published his account of the OEO in his book Justice 
and Reform.  According to Johnson, it was an exciting time.  A great legal adventure was to take 
place as attention turned to the creation of a network of legal aid offices across the nation.  
Now that the OEO, NLADA, ABA and legal aid societies had finally agreed to work together, the 
task of translating goals into actual grants at the local level began.  Johnson described the 
arduous task:    
It absorbed scores of ABA officials and staff members and occupied the time of literally 
thousands of local bar leaders, community action workers, and poverty representatives 
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during the months their local communities were forming Legal Services agencies.  Each 
grant was the culmination of a difficult, often prolonged, political process.  If the funds 
were given to an existing legal aid society, fundamental structural changes and reforms 
had to be negotiated.  If not, an entirely new political entity had to be created.  In either 
case, it took a political feat of some magnitude.72   
 
Along with the demanding task of identifying and creating new agencies, the LSP also 
battled with major policy decisions.   Should law reform that attacks poverty be a priority, or 
should legal services lawyers focus mainly on individual client cases?  The board evaluated the 
OEO initiatives of social rescue, economic development, community organization and law 
reform.  In the end, LSP set five goals: provide individual representation to individual clients, 
advance community legal education, engage in law reform litigation, engage in legislative 
administrative advocacy to change the laws effecting poor people, and engage in community 
economic development.  LSP chose law reform as one of its goals as part of its effort to end 
poverty.   
The OEO focused on fighting poverty.  But why did the existing legal aid programs, with 
their primary focus on access to justice, become OEO recipients?  According to Johnson, 
Bamberger needed to create 75 local agencies by June 30, 1966, and “the most direct way was 
to engender enthusiasm…among the existing 242 legal aid societies...  already organized…with 
boards, staffs, and clients.”73  The plan to use existing programs worked.  By April 1966 the OEO 
made 34 grants to Legal Services, totaling over $6 million, and by end of fiscal year added 
another 70 grants totaling $11 million.   Funding for programs had increased from 
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approximately $5 million in 1965 to more than $25 million for legal services.74  Bamberger 
easily met his goal with 130 grants to communities for legal aid programs and another 25 to law 
schools, bar associations and other groups providing legal support and training.  As grants 
increased and word of mouth spread, more communities began to look at the benefits of 
government funding: LSP readily added $15 million to the budget, funding an additional 145 
agencies.  Within 18 months (January 1, 1966 to June 30, 1967) the OEO helped fund over 300 
Legal Services organizations with an annual budget of $42 million.  As Johnson noted, “Every 
state except Alabama and North Dakota had at least one Legal Services Agency,” and there 
were more than 800 neighborhood law offices in 210 communities, with almost 2000 newly 
funded lawyers.75   
To fulfill its mission and create cohesiveness among grantees, the OEO also funded 
“back-up centers,” which kept local field programs abreast of new developments in regulations 
and funding, as well as national changes in such relevant legal topics as welfare, housing and 
juvenile law.  According to NLADA, OEO funding helped create “a national information 
clearinghouse, a national training program, and specialized programs to work in areas [for] 
particular client populations such as Native Americans and the elderly.”76   
Unfortunately, as it turned out, LSP only had eighteen months to fund its programs. By 
1967, due to President Johnson’s growing need to cater to the right wing for Vietnam War 
funding and the election of many conservatives to Congress in 1966, the OEO budget was 
slashed.   Perhaps more unfortunate for LSP was the fact that less than a quarter of the legal aid 
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programs it funded actually pursued social change.  According to surveys, “only 23 percent of 
the Legal Services boards supported the use of agency resources to achieve legal change.”77  
Earl Johnson felt LSP paid a price for its urgency—not all grantees were screened or fully vetted 
to meet the OEO’s philosophical orientation and antipoverty mission.  It seemed likely that LSP 
would require law reform—it was politically feasible, had potential to make a large impact, and 
was the most relevant priority for legal expertise—but shaping programs into institutions that 
promoted social progress by attacking poverty through law reform would have to happen later, 
if at all.   
 The OEO infused much-needed money to expand legal services.  In 1965, the year 
before any federal funding had begun, the combined total of legal aid societies expended 
approximately $5.4 million and staffed roughly 400 full-time lawyers.  By June 30, 1968, the 
annual operating expenditures of the OEO-LSP exceeded $40 million and staffed over 2000 
positions.  In 1971, the OEO increased its contribution to over $56 million.  The increase in 
funds was significant for legal services:  LSP-funded programs expanded their staff and widened 
their range of services provided.  In 1965, counting all legal aid societies, NLADA reported 
426,457 applicants needing assistance.  By 1971 there were 1,237,725 applicants with an 
increased percentage in welfare related cases.  With added funds, LSP also expanded the reach 
of legal services across the nation.  By 1972, there were 2,660 staff attorneys manning over 850 
offices in more than 200 communities, with only one of the 50 largest U.S. cities lacking a legal 
services program.   
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 According to Johnson, “the tenfold expansion in the financial investment from 1965 to 
1971, and the five-fold enlargement of the lawyer force did not result in a commensurate 
increase in the number of clients served.”78   Programs needed a certain amount of funds for 
administrative costs and overhead; in addition, programs offered more quality type services 
involving law reform.  Although the numbers were a large improvement, these added costs 
account for the disproportionate numbers, and highlight the fact that programs began to focus 
on quality rather than quantity.  It became increasingly obvious that law reform was the 
touchstone of a quality program.   
Promoting Reform 
 In March 1969 Harvard Law School held a Law and Poverty conference.  With over 400 
in attendance, including ABA officials and representatives from almost all legal services 
agencies across the country, keynote speaker Earl Johnson spoke about the value of law 
reform.  He declared, 
it has become apparent that the estimated $400 million to $600 million necessary to 
provide services to every indigent is not going to be available today or in the immediate 
future…I believe law reform is vital because it is the means by which we can provide 
more for the poor than in any other way with less expenditure of time and money.”79   
 
Rather than handle a multitude of cases with the same problem, law reform saved both time 
and money by implementing changes in laws that created the problem to begin with.  Thus all 
client cases could be positively resolved with one change in the law.   Programs engaging in 
class actions (representing a group of people), lobbying, research, and reform activities had the 
potential to exact change through:  repeal or getting rid of laws, making changes to existing 
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laws, or creating new laws; as well as challenging the rules and regulations that have similar 
effects as laws.  The OEO-LSP recognized that law reform was an effective means to enhance 
justice for the poor, and shortly after Johnson’s speech, made it a top priority.   
 The fact that only 23 percent of the boards of legal services considered law reform an 
essential goal, made it difficult for LSP to achieve its mission.  Many directors hired employees 
who aligned with their personal legal aid philosophy, be it liberal or conservative.80    The 
conservative South, in particular, largely held to the belief that legal aid was a form of welfare 
that only expanded government’s role and thus opposed it.  Receiving only a small portion of 
LSP funding, the South had the greatest number of poor people, and the fewest legal aid 
lawyers, which was a setback for the war on poverty.  Moreover, the OEO’s stance on local 
initiative only exacerbated the problem.  As mentioned, the OEO looked to expedite grant 
spending through legal aid societies of which the South had few.   Conservative local bars and 
the legal profession in general had long resisted charitable funds for legal aid, and without their 
support, few Community Action Agencies qualified for grants.  In hopes of circumventing the 
problem of local conservatism, the OEO funded regional legal services programs.   Usually, 
somewhere within the entire state, a liberal element existed to promote the action.  
Unfortunately, the idea did not surface until fiscal year 1968, and by then funding for new 
programs were drying up, thanks to the Vietnam War and an increasingly conservative Congress 
and apathetic electorate.  Ironically, when the money was available, applications in the South 
were not, and when the applications were available, the money was not.     
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 LSP sometimes used the threat of less funding to encourage or coerce programs to 
comply with certain recommendations.  LSP rewarded compliant agencies with increased 
budgets and punished non-compliant agencies with cuts.  This seemed to do the trick.  Johnson 
notes that LSP was extremely reluctant to terminate grants; after all, it was the poor who 
suffered when budgets were cut to programs.  Poor services were better than no services.   
 Funding did not, however, guarantee a good agency.  Staffing was often the difference 
between effective or weak programs.  “Of all the decisions made by the director of the board of 
a local agency,” Johnson concedes, “none ranks in importance with the selection of the staff 
attorneys—the operating personnel who deliver the service to the customer.”81 In short, good 
attorneys equaled good programs; still, local programs found it notoriously difficult to recruit 
talented attorneys.  Johnson argued that agencies “seldom sought out high caliber attorneys.  
Moreover, that kind of lawyer frequently would not accept employment with such an agency 
even if he were offered a position.”82    How then could the OEO-LSP upgrade the quality of 
Legal Services programs?  The OEO, LSP, ABA, local bar associations and almost everyone 
responsible for CAAS and local legal aid programs opposed the idea of federal recruitment or 
federal control over the local hiring process.  And, LSP lacked the authority to set hiring criteria.  
In response, Earl Johnson and LSP introduced national initiatives such as the Reginald Heber 
Smith Fellowship and the use of “backup-up” centers to promote the reform philosophy and 
improve overall program quality.  With the help of these back-up centers and “Reggie” 
recipients, the OEO took an activist stance.  In the end, a 40% increase in average salaries and 
an activist image associated with the OEO helped entice the participation of top-tier attorneys. 
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The “Reggie” 
 The Reginald Heber Smith program funded law schools to establish one-year 
fellowships.83  Nicknamed the “Reggie,” this program helped place the “best and brightest” 
students and lawyers into local legal aid programs.  A prestigious award, the “Reggie” offered 
training in such obscure subjects as housing and welfare law, consumer protection and test 
case litigation.  “Fellows were exposed not only to academicians but also practicing poverty 
lawyers, community organizers and ghetto [sic] residents.”84  In 1967, 50 Fellows were assigned 
to 39 separate agencies as University employees.     
The idea behind the “Reggie” was to attract the best lawyers and enable them to pursue 
the OEO’s goal to end poverty—at least on the legal aid front.  The program circumvented the 
problems associated with local control.  Former Executive Director of Nevada Legal Services and 
“Reggie” recipient Wayne Pressel began his career with Georgia Legal Services.  According to 
Pressel, “the Reggie was a great idea because you could take these little legal aid societies, all 
over the place, and instantly give them a law reform component…and sort of step over the little 
legal aid society and local County Bar association-governed framework.”85   “Reggie” recipients 
did not take on regular caseloads, but instead focused on work with a broad effect and impact 
on poverty.  The program proved successful.  According to Johnson, programs with Fellows 
were responsible for more law reform than all the agencies combined.  One report found that 
80 percent of LSP recipients believed the Reginald Heber Smith Program made a significant 
difference in the increase in law reform.   Fellows also considered their work to be very 
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satisfying, as is evidenced by 85 percent of interns who continued their work in legal services 
after their fellowship ended.  800 Fellows, including top-ranked attorneys and editors of law 
reviews, joined legal services between 1967 and 1972.  In 1968 alone, seven legal services 
employees were editors of the Stanford Law Review.  In essence, the “Reggie” increased the 
effectiveness of the antipoverty strategy by promoting reform and luring high caliber attorneys. 
Johnson considered it one of his most important achievements as director of the OEO legal 
services programs.86 
Back-up Centers 
 The so-called “back-up” centers played a key role in the process.  These centers included 
such entities as: national training programs, an information clearinghouse, and casework 
specializing in areas of substantive law such as welfare and housing, and other subjects 
unavailable in law schools but vitally important for legal aid attorneys. Other programs focused 
on specific client populations such as Native Americans and the elderly.  According to NLADA, 
“this unique national infrastructure of centers engaged in national litigation and legislative and 
administrative representation of eligible clients, while providing support, assistance, and 
training to local programs.”87 These national agencies also worked on legislative reform.  
Outside of local boards, the agencies used test cases to advocate reform and, based on the 
prototype of Edward Sparer’s Center for Social Welfare Policy at Columbia, magnified the LSP’s 
social impact.  In addition, these centers initiated lawsuits and pushed legislative proposals in 
communities with agencies adverse to law reform and provided the time and manpower for 
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agencies bogged down by caseloads, while also providing specific training and research 
materials.  In short, they shared their expertise. Backup centers also promoted a sense of unity 
among programs.  Attorneys felt as if they were part of a national program rather than just 
someone from a local agency.88    
 As a result of the Regional programs, the “Reggie” program, and back-up centers, LSP 
elevated the quality of local programs and services which awarded it more of a national 
presence.  Bamberger and LSP’s success in securing funds for programs across the nation and 
establishing quality programs was not only a local fight, but an administrative one, too.  
Ultimately, to safeguard its mission the LSP, under the aegis of the OEO, had to fight for 
independence and control over its own funding.      
Fight for Independence 
 From 1964 to 1969, three major departments—VISTA, Job Corps and CAP—
administered OEO activities.  VISTA, or Volunteers in Service to America, the nation’s “domestic 
peace corps,” used 3 to 5 percent of the OEO budget.   Job Corps, which offered residential 
retraining and employment programs (based on the Civilian Conservation Corps) accounted for 
25 percent of the agency’s budget, and CAP, the largest program of all, acquired almost 70 
percent of the remaining money.  CAP, which funded the community-based programs, was also 
responsible for LSP. 
 As mentioned, Bamberger and LSP successfully recruited existing legal aid programs to 
meet and exceed the former’s expenditure deadlines.  Not as successful, CAP found it difficult 
to find and fund CAAs.  Its “local initiative” plan was failing, and local CAP programs or CAA’s 
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found it difficult to provide solutions to significantly reduce poverty.  Under political pressure to 
spend the year’s appropriations, the OEO and Sargent Shriver devised pre-packaged 
components that local CAA’s could “buy” such as Headstart and Upward Bound.  Pre-packaged 
or “National emphasis” programs proved more successful than the “local initiative,” as CAA 
applications suddenly increased.  By the end of fiscal year 1964, CAP spent 20 percent of its 
budget on Headstart.   
 Increased spending on CAP programs led to a sort of antagonism with LSP over its 
expenditures.  CAP, which was responsible for the LSP, also managed LSP’s funding.  In fact, 
from the beginning  LSP fought with CAP over money and autonomy.  LSP’s fight for 
independence was arduous.89  According to Johnson’s account, CAP Director Ted Berry 
exacerbated problems by attempting to unilaterally lower the amount of grant money available 
to LSP from $20 million to $15 million.  It seemed to many observers that CAP was deliberately 
thwarting LSP growth.  CAP wanted to contain LSP, and LSP wanted independence from CAP 
and administrative autonomy.  The fight continued until 1969 when Donald Rumsfeld, the first 
Republican OEO director, abolished the CAP administration and elevated LSP’s status.  While 
President Nixon dismantled the OEO, LSP gained temporary independence, reporting directly to 
Rumsfeld.  Nixon affirmed his decision, declaring that the office “will take on central 
responsibility for programs which help provide advocates for the poor in dealing with social 
institutions…This goal will be better served by a separate Legal Services Program.”90 
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 Independence for legal services, with independent boards, was crucial.  Early 
Neighborhood Lawyer programs such as CPI found out the hard way.  Law professor Soia 
Mentschikoff argued that representation of an interest or client  
may involve warfare with medical services, the educational services, the entire political 
structure of the city which is involved, and with every social service agency in the 
city…legal services cannot, should not and must not rest on an integration of general 
community programs.91 
 
 The elimination of the CAP administration defused some of LSP’s internal challenges, 
but LSP by its very nature created powerful enemies by the type of work it was designed to 
undertake.  The legal aid attorneys, in their quest for law reform not only challenged 
government at all levels but also large corporations and businesses that contributed to political 
campaigns.   By attacking the very institutions that funded powerful individuals, they created 
powerful opponents. Each successful attack contributed to growing efforts in Congress to 
curtail LSP’s so-called “hand-biting” activities.   
Opponents of LSP 
In our government of laws and not of men, each member of our society is entitled to have his conduct 
judged and regulated in accordance with the law; seek any lawful objective through legally permissible 
means; and to present for adjudication any lawful claim, issue, or defense. 
--Canon 7, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility 
 
 LSP programs helped change the legal circumstances of low-income Americans.   Thanks 
to legal representation, clients improved their lives by securing a range of benefits from income 
support, employment, and housing, to better working and living environments.  Over time, legal 
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aid programs created political enemies in the process.92  This was a real threat.  Political 
opponents, including members of Congress, wielded influence over members of the 
Congressional oversight committees, who in turn held the power to end legal services in 
America.93  Political interference exposed the vulnerability of local programs.  Such was the 
case when California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) brought suit against Governor Ronald 
Reagan and successfully blocked his attempts to cut welfare programs.  In response, Reagan 
vetoed a $1.8 million refunding grant to CRLA.   
 Reagan’s veto was based on a report by Lewis K. Uhler, whom the governor had 
appointed director of California’s OEO.  Uhler’s report, A Study and Evaluation of California 
Rural Legal Assistance, listed 127 allegations of misconduct including inciting riots, the misuse 
of OEO funds, and an attorney brazenly walking barefoot into court.  Some Democrats 
considered Uhler’s appointment and report to be politically motivated, a result of earlier 
tension between Reagan and CRLA.   In 1967, CRLA successfully blocked his attempts to cut 
California’s welfare programs, but Reagan’s veto highlighted the vulnerability of Legal Services 
programs to political attacks.  A Republican-backed amendment to the Economic Opportunity 
Act (42 U.S.C. § 2834) in 1970, awarded governors veto power over state OEO expenditures. 
Once vetoed, only the Director of OEO could override the action.  In response to Reagan’s veto, 
CRLA and supporters launched a campaign to save the program.  After an all-out effort by CRLA 
and others to overturn the veto, the OEO commission ultimately absolved CRLA of any 
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misconduct.94  But an important lesson was learned—publically funded legal services programs 
were vulnerable to political interference. According to NLADA, “The CRLA controversy, along 
with similar fights in other states, made it increasingly clear that political interference would 
continue so long as the program remained within the Executive Branch.”95   
 Influential opponents, such as Vice President Spiro Agnew and Howard Phillips, also 
spoke out against legal services. Agnew grew incensed with legal services after the Camden 
Coalition v. Nardi case, in which OEO-funded Camden Regional Legal Services (CRLS) secured a 
preliminary injunction against the city of Camden, New Jersey.   CRLS proved that the city had 
violated federal law by failing to provide low-income replacement housing for displaced tenants 
after their apartments were destroyed.  According to Jerome Falk, Agnew’s allegations “might 
have been lifted bodily from the now infamous Uhler report.”96 Agnew claimed that legal 
services officials involved themselves with social issues unrelated to ending poverty such as 
women’s rights, anti-war protests, free-speech movements and prisoners.  Agnew also accused 
these programs of allocating resources for these causes at the expense of the poor. Indeed, he 
charged these “ideological vigilantes” with turning away clients with more urgent concerns such 
as eviction notices.  Agnew asked OEO-LSP director Fred Speaker to investigate.  After the 
investigation, including an on-site visit, review of court documents, and interviews from both 
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sides, Speaker submitted his report exonerating the Camden Legal Services lawyers.  In his 
report Speaker emphasized that “It is essential to remember we are lawyers in an adversary 
system with judges the final authority”97 
 In 1973, a Baltimore grand jury found evidence of bribery and extortion involving Agnew 
while Baltimore County executive, Governor of Maryland and Vice President.  Agnew dodged 
indictment by pleading no contest to one count of tax evasion.98  Agnew resigned on October 
10, 1973, only ten months before Nixon, but not before his spirited crusade intimidated local 
legal services program officials and led to Fred Speaker’s resignation.99    “For many,” said Earl 
Johnson, “Fred Speaker was seen as a casualty of the vice president’s war against legal services 
lawyers and their challenges to government policies detrimental to the clients they served.”100 
The following year, the Maryland Court of Appeals disbarred Agnew, characterizing his actions 
as “morally obtuse.”   
 Conservative columnist for Human Events Howard Phillips targeted OEO-LSP.  Johnson 
credits Phillips with “stirring up” much of the opposition, especially from the far right 
community, to the program.  In 1971 Phillips became the Assistant Director for Program Review 
at the OEO.  After Nixon vetoed the bipartisan Mondale-Steiger bill, an attempt to remove Legal 
Services from the Executive Branch of government, Phillips proposed a “revenue-sharing” 
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program.  In an effort to appease the conservative wing of the Republican Party, the Nixon 
administration considered the plan, but ultimately dropped it, opting instead to modify the 
initial committee bill.101  Two years later, skirting Senate approval, Nixon appointed Phillips as 
Acting Director of the OEO.   
 In 1973, at the beginning of his second term, Nixon announced that the OEO would be 
disbanded within a year.  LSP’s future suddenly became uncertain.  With Phillips’ background 
and his polemical stance against OEO-LSP, Nixon knew the Senate would not approve of 
Phillips’ far right conservative politics.   He appointed him anyway.  Phillips adopted a hard-line 
approach by immediately abolishing the OEO-LSP Notational Advisory Committee, issuing an 
edict ending law reform, and moving legal services programs and some support centers from 
annual to 30-day funding.102  From month to month, program officials worried about their 
existence.  Constrained by concerns over funding, programs stopped accepting new cases.   
Ultimately two lawsuits brought an end to Phillips’ attacks on LSP.  In a consolidated case, 
American Federation of Government Employees v. Howard Phillips, et al. (1973), Judge William 
B. Jones found in favor of the OEO employees.  The court ruled that Nixon’s failure to include 
OEO funding in the 1974 budget did not give Phillips the authority to cut or refuse funding to 
grantees.  In effect, the court held that Congress, not the executive branch, appropriates funds, 
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so the presidential budget request did not take precedence over appropriations.103  In Williams 
v. Phillips (1973), District Judge William B. Jones declared Nixon’s appointment of Phillips illegal.  
Together, both cases invalidated everything Phillips had done, but not before he fired director 
Terry Lezner, director and 1969 “Reggie” fellow Ted Tetzlaff and deputy director Frank Jones; 
and not before he installed a group of conservative allies into key positions within the OEO, 
which proved disastrous for many grantees.104   
 Following Reagan’s veto, Agnew’s investigations, Nixon’s determination to dismantle 
OEO, and Howard Phillips’ purge, it was clear to many supporters that legal services needed to 
be insulated from further attacks.  The ABA House of Delegates and the National Legal Aid 
Defenders Association both passed resolutions calling for an independent legal services 
program.   
Evaluation 
 What did the OEO-LSP accomplish in its short life?  “If judged by the ambitions of some 
of its more brilliant and optimistic pioneers, such as Edward Sparer,” Johnson argues, “the 
lawyers OEO funded had largely failed.”105  Millions lived in poverty in 1974, just as millions did 
in 1965. Where was the widespread reform of the welfare system?  Where was the 
constitutional right to the necessities of life?  Johnson maintains that OEO-LSP funded lawyers 
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brought justice to millions of poor people.  Poverty may not have been ended, but lawyers 
helped reduce the poverty income gap and mitigated the degree and consequences of poverty.  
As he explained,  
Lawyers won victories that put money in the pockets of individual poor people and 
occasionally entire classes…they saved clients from losing their apartments or forced 
landlords to make repairs…they removed barriers to economic advancement such as 
racial discrimination.106   
 
Legal services attorneys won landmark cases such as Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), King v. Smith 
(1968), and Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) that not only increased eligibility and rolls for public 
assistance, but also helped secure dignity for their clients as well.  The Shapiro case involved 
nineteen-year-old Vivian Thompson, an expecting mother, who had recently moved from 
Massachusetts to find that she did not meet Connecticut’s one-year residency requirement; as 
a result, Welfare Commissioner Bernard Shapiro denied her application for aid.  Officials argued 
that needy citizens moved to this state to obtain better benefits, and without a one-year 
residency the State was unequipped to budget properly for welfare expenses.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court found in favor of Thompson, ruling that by denying aid based on residency 
states unfairly restricted welfare recipients of their fundamental right to freedom to travel.107   
 The welfare system in the 1960s wielded control over recipients by the threat of 
denying benefits.  Oftentimes, rules were placed on recipients in an effort to control moral 
behavior.  In 1967, state, city, and county welfare departments held the power to remove 
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children from mothers with “multiple instances of illegitimacy.”108  The Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program also endorsed the “man in the house” regulation, which 
denied benefits to mothers who cohabitated, either inside or outside their homes, with “able-
bodied” men, aka “substitute fathers.”  Caseworkers dropped by unannounced and rifled 
through closets and drawers looking for signs of a man in the house. This action not only denied 
the mother of the child privacy and discretion over her personal life, but often split up homes 
with unemployed fathers.  For example, the State of Alabama denied Mrs. Sylvester Smith and 
her four children aid, based on her sexual relations with Mr. Williams.  Williams, who visited 
Smith on the weekends, was not the father of any of her children and did not support them.  In 
the case of King v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Alabama did not meet its obligation 
to furnish aid.  Moreover, Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation, which was designed to 
discourage illegitimacy and sexual impropriety, had no relation to the need of a child.  A 
“substitute father” such as Williams was not a parent with a state-imposed duty of support.109 
The Court’s decision set a precedent giving AFDC mothers a semblance of dignity to have sexual 
relations without fear of losing their welfare benefits.   
 In 1967 John Kelly, on behalf of welfare recipients in New York, challenged AFDC’s 
procedure for notice and termination of benefits, which offered no official notice and did not 
allow recipients any opportunity to plead their case before scheduled terminations.  In the case 
of Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), the U.S. Supreme Court held that welfare benefits are statutory 
entitlements; as such, recipients had a right to due process.  The decision required hearings for 
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welfare recipients to present evidence, question adverse parties, and argue their case with or 
without counsel before being removed from the rolls.110  
 Legal services lawyers also made accessible additional money and benefits for the poor.  
Despite county opposition, lawyers in twenty-six states sued to secure federal food aid such as 
the Commodity Distribution and Food Stamp programs, to feed hungry welfare claimants.  In 
1971 Ed Polk from the Dallas Legal Services Foundation and Ronald Pollack from the Center on 
Social Welfare Policy at Law in New York, brought action against Nixon’s Secretary of 
Agriculture to implement one of the two federal food programs in the state of Texas.   In the 
case of Jay v. Department of Agriculture (1971), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals required 108 
reluctant Texas counties to join the food programs.  In time, one county after another relented.  
“This campaign alone,” noted Johnson, “yielded a dividend of several hundred million dollars in 
food benefits to millions of the poor.”111  Between 1967 and 1971, over 8 million people were 
added to the food stamp rolls and the associated budget increased from $296 million to $2.7 
billion.112  According to Johnson, “legal services lawsuits sought to force local governments to 
enlarge their school lunch programs for low-income children.”113  These lawsuits also prodded 
Congress to enact the National School Lunch Program in 1970. Too often in states like Texas 
and Alabama, whose economies profited mightily from the cheap labor provided by a large 
population of African American and other minority workers as well as poor whites, the ruling 
white majority at the state and county levels tried to penny-pinch the poor on food, with the 
courts having to intervene.  Indeed, poor Americans in all parts of the nation, but especially in 
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the South and Southwest, needed welfare advocates to help them periodically to combat 
conservative officials in states that routinely exploited cheap labor while skimping on programs 
that helped supplement their meager incomes.   
 The Western Center on Law and Poverty, on behalf of not only John Serrano, the parent 
of a Los Angeles Public School student, but all California public-school pupils, brought a class 
action suit against the California State Treasurer, Ivy Priest, challenging the Golden State’s 
method of funding its public schools.  The distribution of funding showed large disparities 
between districts.  In the wealthiest district, the funding per pupil averaged $2,586, compared 
to the poorest district at only $407.114  Adding to the problem, California raised property taxes 
in individual districts to meet a minimum level of educational funding for their respective 
schools.  This meant that property owners in poorer districts could be taxed at higher rates than 
those in more affluent districts.   In Serrano v. Priest (1971), the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
held that California’s public-school funding based on local district taxes from real property and 
state aid, which led to inequalities in educational expenditures, violated the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The court also found no compelling interest to bind a 
pupil’s education to property values.  The Serrano decision helped ameliorate the problem of 
unequal school funding for students in poor neighborhoods.  California thus injected outside 
money to help subsidize its impoverished communities.115   
 Legal aid attorneys continued making important strides by winning cases that enforced 
minimum wages and hours for women and children agricultural workers, Rivera v. Division of 
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Industrial Welfare (1968), eliminated illegal lending practices, Clermont v. Secured Investment 
Corp. (1972), increased consumer protections in contracts, Jefferson Credit Corp v. Marcano 
(1969), and prevented price gouging, Jones v. Star Credit (1969).  In Sniadach v. Family Finance 
Corp (1968) and Fuentes v. Shevin (1972), the US Supreme Court outlawed wage garnishments 
and repossessions until debtors received hearings.   
 Through these actions legal services lawyers helped to reduce the poverty income gap, 
the amount of money to raise millions of lower income Americans up to and over the poverty 
line.  In 1964, when the War on Poverty began, the gap amounted to $15.6 billion; six years 
later it narrowed to $10 billion.116  According to a Congressional Budget Office report, during 
the 1965-1975 periods, poverty declined by sixty percent.117   
  
Legal services lawyers also opened up more opportunities for minorities.  By LSP’s practical 
launch in 1965, Brown v. Board of Education was over a decade old.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
had been passed and under Title XII the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
designed to eliminate employment discrimination, was enacted.  By September President 
Johnson signed Executive Order 11246 requiring government contractors to establish non-
discriminatory practices in hiring.  Given the history of race/color and sex-based discrimination 
in the U.S., Johnson’s administration pushed affirmative action to promote better job 
opportunities for minority groups and women.  “In many respects, equal opportunity was a joke for 
millions of those living in the United States,” declared Earl Johnson, “as were their chances of 
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getting a decent job and scaling the economic ladder.”118  Nevertheless, lawsuits were integral 
in supporting affirmative action by suing for enforcement of civil rights and eliminating job 
discrimination barriers.  In one case, Herbert Nowlin from the Legal Aid Association of Ventura 
County and Joel Edelman from the Western Center on Law and Poverty on behalf of Latino and 
black elementary school students successfully brought a class action suit against the Oxnard 
School District’s policy of racial segregation, Soria v. Oxnard School District, (1974).   The court 
ordered California school boards to correct the racial imbalance.  When intelligent Spanish-
speaking students were placed in remedial courses, lawyers challenged English IQ placement 
tests in local schools.  Even before Diana v. California State Board of Education (1970) made it 
to court, the State Board of Education responded by implementing a system that allowed 
students to take the test in a language of their choice.  California Rural Legal Assistance 
successfully struck down English literacy tests used in voting; in doing so, thousands of Spanish 
speaking citizens gained suffrage, Castro v. State of California, (1970). Then in 1972, a San Diego 
Federal Court judge ordered Imperial Irrigation to implement affirmative action, NAACP, et al. 
v. Imperial Irrigation District, (1972).   
  From 1959 to 1971, legal assistance for America’s poor increased ten-fold.  LSP helped 
finance 250 local legal services programs employing more than 2,600 attorneys and instituted 
an “impact work” philosophy that transcended the routine processing of individual client 
claims.  LSP recorded a 17 percent litigation record.  “During its nine-year tenure, 1965 through 
1974” says Lawrence, “LSP attorneys brought 164 cases to the Supreme Court on behalf of the 
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poor, 119 of which were accepted for review.”119  Lawrence’s study of LSP’s Supreme Court 
cases reveals that 74 percent of cases involved challenges to state or local laws where state or 
local governments were the opposing party.  “In 84 percent of cases, in which the LSP was the 
respondent, state governments were challenging the Program’s lower court victories.”120  By 
having an LSP attorney to file an appeal in lower courts, opposing parties gained better access 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Before LSP, only one appellate case, Heydenreich v. Lyons, 
challenged residency requirements.  “By the time Shapiro got to the Supreme Court,” reports 
Lawrence, “cases challenging residency requirements had been filed in 15 or 20 
jurisdictions.”121  In the end, LSP won 62 per cent of its Supreme Court cases.   
 According to Johnson, these victories were only part of the story.  For every Supreme 
Court case there were scores of lesser appellate cases.  And for every federal or state appellate 
court case there were hundreds of cases in trial courts.  OEO-funded legal service lawyers won 
approximately 60 percent of their lesser appellate cases and over 70 percent of their trial cases.  
In addition to success in the courts, these lawyers “persuaded local governments and 
administrative agencies to adopt policies favorable to the poor, educating poor people about 
their legal rights and responsibilities, and even teaching them how to represent themselves.”122 
 NLADA statics show that in 1971 approximately 2,500 lawyers served 1.2 million clients 
annually. 123  A majority of casework involved family law (36.6 percent) followed by economic 
(15.9 percent) and housing (14.4 percent) issues, with 11.2 percent of cases dealing with 
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welfare and social security.124  Based on these numbers, during its seven-year existence LSP 
served over seven million clients in matters not unlike the early charitably-funded legal aid 
programs.  In addition to the seven million, a million to three million clients benefitted from 
reform via class actions and court victories.   
 If viewed as an interest group seeking widespread welfare reform, LSP fell short of 
success.  However, if one measures quality by defense of a client, legal services did well.  OEO-
funded legal services programs litigated 11 percent more of their cases than programs prior to 
OEO.125 Evidence of the result is in the drop from 54 percent to 42 percent of legal aid clients 
receiving only advice.  There had not been a single case that made it to the U.S. Supreme Court 
during the 89-year history of the legal aid movement from 1876 to 1965.  In contrast, from 
1967 to 1972, 217 cases involving the rights of the poor were decided, with 73 wins.  Of course, 
in the 1960s and ‘70s America was more sympathetic to the plight of the poor, a condition that 
LSP lawyers fully exploited.  Lawrence reasoned that “If LSP is viewed as a mechanism by which 
a new class of litigants was able to place its civil claims before the Supreme Court and influence 
the policy decisions emanating from that institution, LSP can be characterized as a success.”126  
According to a report by a consulting firm in 1971, “Both the quantity and quality of the 
individual services rendered by Legal Services projects far exceeded that generally offered by 
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their predecessors…and in most instances at least equals that provided by private attorneys to 
paying clients.”127   
 It is difficult to measure the full impact the OEO-LSP funded lawyers had.  Cases such as 
Shapiro v. Thompson, King v. Smith, Goldberg v. Kelly, Jay v. Department of Agriculture, Serrano 
v. Priest, and others like Castro v. State of California, and Rivera v. Division of Industrial Welfare 
greatly improved the daily lives of millions of poor people.  With the creation of LSP, the nation 
made a commitment to providing the impoverished with access to civil courts.  With the formal 
adoption of law reform as a program priority in 1969, LSP, in its brief history, provided counsel 
and spurred appellate challenges.  When met with problems related to reluctant or resource-
limited programs unfocused on law reform, LSP worked to provide solutions such as “Reggies,” 
back-up centers and clearinghouses.  LSP faced a challenge in seeking reform in a hostile 
environment full of obstacles that included opposition from grantees themselves, since not all 
legal services attorneys supported reform.  In fact, according to Susan E. Lawrence, “broader 
support for the Program rested on normative beliefs of equal access to justice.”128 
Nevertheless, according to Lawrence, “LSP reduced the poor’s de facto exclusion from the 
judicial process which culminates in the U.S. Supreme Court.”129  
 The OEO-LSP tasked itself with overcoming the inherited deficiencies of early legal aid 
societies such as underfunding, unrealistic caseloads, untrained attorneys and the questionable 
professional independence of volunteers.  But even with ten times the money, five times the 
staff, and triple the caseload, it still fell short of serving all the poor.  A study by Gresham Sykes 
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in 1969, revealed that 6 to 10 million poor a year needed help, far more than the million being 
served.130 The financial truth is that even with dramatic improvement in talent and greater 
program impact, legal services attorneys could not handle 38 million people.  Without 
additional funds, one lawyer would have had to represent 15,000 people annually, an 
impossible task.  What lawyers did accomplish, however, was an incredible amount of legal 
reform and social welfare in a relatively short time.   Lawyers were harassed, threatened, and 
even terminated for their success.   In the end and in the name of the poor, they created 
enemies bent on ridding the government of OEO-LSP.   “I was proud of the young lawyers who 
turned down fat, corporate practices to work for the poor,” Sargent Shriver declared, “and 
proudest of them when they dared to challenge state and federal procedures and win.”131  The 
Office of Economic Opportunity was abolished in 1981 in the early days of President Reagan’s 
presidential administration.   
The End of LSP 
 According to NLADA, “The CRLA controversy, along with similar fights in other states, 
made it increasingly clear that political interference would continue so long as the program 
remained within the Executive Branch.”132  Recognizing a short life-span and possible future 
demise of the OEO, the ABA, NLADA and others such as the Cahns began looking for a new 
home for LSP as early as 1970.  But where could LSP go?   
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 In 1969 President Nixon and his new administration created a six-member Advisory 
Council on Executive Organization, nicknamed the “Ash Council,” which worked to reorganize a 
number of organizations, including OEO.  By 1973, Nixon’s administration dismantled and 
transferred all but three OEO programs:  legal services, economic development and community 
action.  Transfer of these programs required an act of Congress.   
 According to Johnson, “Legal services supporters, and presumably the Nixon 
administration itself, wanted to divorce the program and its lawyers from the executive branch 
of government.”133  ABA committee lawyers such as William Klaus and John Douglas 
recommended an independent organization resembling the Public Broadcasting System (PBS), 
called the Legal Services Corporation.134  The NLADA recommended that the Justice 
Department house legal services.  Edgar and Jean Cahn suggested first the federal judiciary, and 
then an independent entity. In the end, the Ash Council approved the Cahns’ second choice, an 
independent entity.  The council’s choice for an independent, non-profit corporation also 
placed Nixon and the ABA in agreement.   
 In 1974, the administration’s budget contained no funds for OEO.  The three programs 
that remained received $185 million for community action, $71.5 million for legal services, and 
$39.3 million for economic development.135    In 1974, with the Economic Opportunity 
amendments, Congress disbanded, but did not completely abolish, the OEO and created the 
Community Services Administration (CSA) to handle the remaining programs.  Most OEO 
programs and their employees moved to existing old-line agencies.   
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 On May 11, 1974, after two attempts at earlier legislation including a presidential veto 
of the Mondale-Steiger bill in 1971 and a conference committee withdrawal in 1972, Nixon 
proposed a second Legal Services bill.  Ominously, the Senate Select Committee began its 
Watergate hearings six days later.  On July 27, 1974, Nixon signed the LSC Act creating the Legal 
Services Corporation (LSC).  On the historic evening of August 8, Nixon told Americans in a 
national television address, “I shall resign the presidency effective noon tomorrow.”136  LSC was 
the last act he signed as President.    
End of Reform 
 Opponents of LSP had gained some ground in the political battle over federal funds.  
LSC’s pyrrhic victory toward independence came at a cost to the poor.  Legal services 
eliminated the controversial initiatives of the OEO from the statute.137  Thus began LSC’s 
departure from the “War on Poverty,” and the waning of a comprehensive approach to ending 
poverty.  Earl Johnson noted that “It was the last time lawyers representing the poor would 
have such a favorable climate for leveling the legal landscape through the courts and in the 
country’s legislatures.”138  The U.S. Supreme Court majority that favored such a liberal climate 
changed.  Johnson contends that appeals won in the late 1960s through the mid-1970s would 
have been lost in the 1980s; in addition, legislative advocacy in the 1960s was more popular at 
the time thanks to the liberal Congress. With the transfer of LSP to LSC, the lawyer’s mission 
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changed.  Programs were no longer evaluated on their effectiveness in reducing poverty.  
Rather, it became a numbers game as the “access to justice” phase of legal services began.   
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The Legal Services Corporation  
The deal was we would tone it down, make it something beholden to the paternalism of the American 
Bar Association. And that's how we got the Legal Services Corporation. 
—Wayne Pressel, 2014 
Introduction 
 Although the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) greatly increased the amount of funds 
available to Legal Services programs, its new campaign "Access to Justice" marked a movement 
away from quality legal services.  LSC rescued Legal Services from the dying Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO), but it came at a price for the poor as the controversial initiatives of the OEO 
Legal Services Program (LSP) were eliminated.  LSC’s criteria for funding were so strict that 
some legal services programs were split or “spun-off” of LSC-funded programs to continue less 
restricted work. In the 1970s and afterward actions by the Republican-dominated Congresses, 
(gaining complete control of Congress in 1994) and  other conservatives have increased 
restrictions on LSC funds to the point where Legal Services programs began turning into a 
Private Attorney General for State governments—upholding the law rather than challenging it.  
The result has been diminished capacity in providing access to justice for the poor.  LSC and the 
American Bar Association (ABA) initiatives such as Private Attorney Involvement (PAI), 
alternative delivery methods such as Pro Se, and the push for non-LSC funds promoting a return 
to the private charitable days of legal aid societies, were all favourable events for those 
believing legal aid is a form of welfare.   An increased reliance on private funds and Pro Bono is 
a concern for many who believe that more government assistance is required to fill the 
widening gap between justice and the poor.  LSC restrictions create a costly and inefficient 
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overlap of legal services, making it difficult to coordinate the patchwork of legal services 
entities providing our make-shift civil Gideon today.139   
 This chapter outlines the political problems associated with LSC.  It discusses the 
"minimum access" strategy, and the issues related to a poverty line.  The chapter also covers 
LSC’s susceptibility to politics, the increasing restrictions on using LSC funds, and LSC's push for 
alternatives such as private attorney involvement and the use of non-LSC funds.  Next it 
discusses the "Republican Revolution" of the 1980s, which resulted in the greatest restrictions 
on funding and ultimately ended the controversial "Support Centers" and the "Reggie" 
program.  It also describes the changes LSC-funded programs were forced to make.  Finally, the 
chapter will offer an analysis of "diminished capacity" for lawyers and whether civil legal 
representation will become a matter of right. 
Legal Services Corporation 
 LSC was supposed to deliver LSP from U.S. government control, but it came with 
historical controversies and ongoing debates over the mission of federally-funded legal services 
and the looming threat of defunding.140   Ideally, the program would be kept free from political 
pressure, and attorneys would have full freedom “to protect the best interests of their 
clients,”141 but LSC was only quasi-independent.  Congress failed to heed the lessons learned by 
the early neighborhood lawyer programs; as a result LSC did not have a truly independent 
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board.  Congressional control over budgets and presidential appointments of the board left the 
federally-funded program, however insulated, vulnerable to political attacks; and, in keeping 
with the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers would no longer represent controversial 
clients, as that population of the poor was simply restricted from accessing legal services 
beforehand.    
Access to Justice 
 According to Jon Sasser, the ABA, as a champion of Legal Services, recycled the term 
“Access to Justice” as part of a political strategy.  The idea of access to justice for the entire 
nation meant expanding vending for legal services—deciding how many lawyers were needed 
for a city or county’s poverty population of poor residents.  “Now the ABA could say,” noted 
Sasser, “we’ve got vast areas of the country that have very little to no legal services 
coverage.”142  Thus, by assuming a generic and amorphous goal for the entire nation, LSC could 
go to Congress each year and report, “we still don’t have equal access to justice.” 
 The OEO-LSP used incentive-based funding to help ensure quality programs.  But under 
the LSC Act, which recognized a need to provide equal access to the system of justice, LSC could 
no longer justify denying funds to all poor people in the name of quality; especially those living 
in areas without representation. Thus, shortly after LSC finally took responsibility of legal 
services from the Community Service Administration in October 1976, the board adopted a 
“minimum access” plan.   The “minimum” plan targeted two lawyers per 10,000 poor people.143   
According to Earl Johnson, “The ‘law reform’ banner had done its job and run its course, as had 
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the War on Poverty.  It was time to abandon that tattered banner and raise a new and different 
one—Access to Justice.”144  
Minimum Access 
 In 1976, Congress appropriated $88 million plus a $4.5 million supplement for LSC, just 
shy of LSC’s request for $96 million.  This was $21.5 million more than LSP received.145  For fiscal 
year (FY) 1977 Congress appropriated $125 million for LSC.  Between 1976 and 1981, with 
increased funding and support, LSC significantly expanded legal services to cover every county 
in the nation.  According to legal aid consultant, John Arango,  
Every year the corporation would prepare a map showing all the counties in the United 
States, and which counties were covered by a legal services program.  This proved to be 
a very effective tool for congress, because they would look at the counties that were in 
their congressional district and see that the counties weren’t colored in, and so they 
would make an effort to get a legal services program.146 
 
By 1981, LSC achieved its “minimum access” goal.  
 The increase in available funds stirred controversy over the “minimum access” strategy.  
The primary concern was quantity versus quality.  “It was certainly a shift away from the OEO 
principles, we would make legal services a national movement, but they were going to have a 
legal aid lawyer in every chicken pot,” argued former Nevada Legal Services Executive Director 
Wayne Pressel, “so you wound up with this huge expansion of legal services in rural areas, 
western places…but in that expansion a whole lot was lost.”147 For Pressel, LSC was simply 
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providing a nationwide blanket of untrained legal aid lawyers.  Legal Services’ focus now fell on 
the means rather than the ends, providing “access” rather than abolishing “poverty.”    
 According to Sasser, “Access to Justice” had advantages and weaknesses.  It helped the 
poorly underfunded programs in the West, which was good.  “It was bad,” conceded Sasser, “in 
that funding did not go to the existing established programs doing all the great work...taking 
cases to the U.S. Supreme Court like Goldberg v. Kelly.”148  In short, all the new money went to 
programs in the West that lacked the quality and experience of programs in the East.  “Also, 
those out West didn't have the five goals of the Act to sort of push them,” said Sasser, “Those 
of us that were old-timers always believed that we took the five goals out of the statute for 
political reasons, but they were still what legal services programs were all about—what they 
were supposed to do.”149    
Poverty Line 
 The controversial minimum access strategy, which helped determine the number of 
attorneys needed per poverty population, spurred concern over the nation’s calculated poverty 
line.   The Social Security Administration (SSA) established a poverty threshold in 1959, but with 
the national expansion of legal services and increased funding into new areas, the poverty line 
issue gained traction.150  Since the war on poverty began Earl Johnson observed, “We have 
become accustomed to defining the poor by recourse to a fixed income standard, a so-called 
poverty line.”151  Beginning with OEO-LSP, LSC continued using poverty guidelines to determine 
client eligibility for legal services.  Those living within 125 percent of the poverty line were 
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eligible for services.  In 1965, the SSA poverty guidelines for a family of four were $3,130; in 
other words, a family of four making less than or equal to $3,130 a year qualified for services.  
By the time LSC assumed its role in 1975, the poverty line for a family of four increased to 
$5,050.152  
 Another concern over the “access” strategy was the distribution of money based on 
poverty populations in accordance with a set national poverty line.  The strategy did not 
account for changing costs of living.  According to the early model, $7 for one person or an 
annual income set at 125 percent of the national poverty represented more purchasing power 
in one area of the country than another.  Cost of living varied depending on whether one lived 
in the North, South or another region or sub-region, and whether they lived in an urban or rural 
setting.  The Institute for Research on Poverty identified the cost of living problem along with 
other problems associated with a poverty line.153  “It does not reflect modern expenses and 
resources, excluding significant draws on income such as taxes, work expenses, and out-of-
pocket medical expenses.”154  The unequal weight and arbitrary line of poverty widened the 
gap between qualifying for legal services and the affordability of a private attorney.  LSC drew 
the line at X amount.  If a family of four earned $5,051 in 1975, one dollar over the guideline, 
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did that suddenly mean it could afford the costs associated with a private lawyer?  According to 
AnnaMarie Johnson, Executive Director of Nevada Legal Services, “They have never put in 
leeway for a person that just makes a dollar over that amount.  These days,” Johnson explained, 
“most people can’t afford a lawyer, even those that are deemed middle class.” 155   
  Another issue with the poverty line is that it is an approximation, an estimate designed 
to identify the amount of income required to maintain a minimal standard of living for shelter, 
food and clothing, etc.  Thus, poverty would be eliminated if everyone were elevated above an 
arbitrary line.  However, poverty could also be based on a nation’s affluence—a percentage of 
the nation’s total goods and services.156 In other words, the degree of poverty is relative to the 
surrounding wealth of the community.  Whether one fell barely above the line, regardless of 
the depth of economic need, cost of living or out-of-pocket expenses, or did not qualify for 
reasons such as being an unmarried partner, they were not entitled to legal services.  Based on 
one’s definition of poverty, most low to middle class American families were denied access to 
justice.     
Minimum Access Continues 
 By the start of Jimmy Carter’s presidency in 1977 the number of legal services programs 
had increased from 258 in 1975 to 320.  From 1977 to 1981, the Carter administration 
supported the “minimum access” strategy, while promoting national support centers.  Notably, 
a favorable 1977 amendment to the LSC Act lifted the ban on representing juveniles.  The 
Carter Administration and his LSC appointments worked to relax restrictions on grants to back-
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up centers and the prohibition against legal aid lawyers organizing groups.  Clients of Legal 
Services were also appointed to local boards. 
 Had the larger social questions affecting clients subsided?  Research tracing 102 lawyers 
who left a major legal services program in Chicago between 1965 and 1974 found that 40 
percent continued on with some type of legal activism.  They moved to other legal services 
programs, created “impact” private law practices, taught legal clinics, joined public interest law 
firms, or worked in government jobs enforcing civil rights.157  It seems the original draw of law 
reform was not easily diminished. Nevertheless, the external pressure created by outside 
organizations such as local Community Action Agencies to address issues of poverty had 
diminished.  As one LSC staff member complained, “Many legal services programs no longer 
address the underlying political questions that affect their clients.”158 
 In 1978 the Carter Administration appointed prominent attorney and Arkansas 
Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton as chair of the board of LSC.  “We believed it important not to 
spread the program so thinly while we were trying to provide access,” she noted, “However, if 
we were to hold up expansion until…quality was in place and the backup systems were 
available, then that didn’t make sense either.”159  Under Carter’s administration, Clinton 
successfully lobbied Congress for LSC increases, which rose to $205 million in 1978, $270 million 
in 1979 and $300 million in 1980.160  In 1981 the LSC budget hit a high watermark of $321 
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million.  (During President Obama’s first year, LSC received $440 million, which is equivalent to 
an inflation-adjusted amount of $178 million).  By 1981, LSC supported 325 grantees with 1,450 
offices including 6,200 lawyers and 3,000 paralegals.  Legal services covered all 50 states, plus 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 
 Expansion of legal services proved difficult.  According to Clinton, “There was 
opposition, including speeches on the floor of the House and resolutions in local bar 
associations.”161  It was especially difficult in the South.  Earl Johnson praised Dan Bradley, 
Bucky Askew and Clint Lyons among others for their work in the South.  Bradley became 
President of LSC in 1979, and helped thwart the Reagan Administration’s attack on the program 
in the 1980s. Later, he became a leading advocate of gay rights. Askew, the OEO-LSP deputy 
regional director in 1970, was appointed to LSC’s Board of Directors by Bill Clinton in 1994. 
Lyons served as acting LSC President, and then headed the NLADA.  Interestingly, both Bradley 
and Lyons were “Reggies.”  Their combined efforts led to 13 new legal services grantees, the 
first of 30 grantees in the South.  Grantees included Legal Services of Alabama, Georgia Legal 
Services, and Rural Legal Services of Tennessee, as well as statewide support centers in all 10 
Southeast Region states.   
Under Attack   
 According to Wayne Pressel, Legal Services gradually became beholden to the American 
Bar Association.  “Almost every ABA president had legal services as his or her first priority 
agenda item for years,” said Pressel, “we were protected by the ABA, but we were becoming 
                                                          
161
 Johnson, 486. 
68 
 
the parent-children.”162   According to Nevada Supreme Court Justice Michael Douglas, the ABA 
“is a national organization with clout because they donate to political campaigns, individually 
and sometimes collectively.”163  As the governing body of the legal profession, the ABA 
composed of trial lawyers, consumer lawyers, bankruptcy lawyers and others grudgingly 
supported legal services.  Pressel described fights with the ABA, which generally resisted his 
“old-time” legal services approach.  “By old time,” said Pressel, “I mean now OEO Legal Services 
types that would be embarrassments to the ABA.”164  He expanded on the problem of being the 
ABA’s protected child, 
There was nothing institutional about legal services before the Legal Services 
Corporation; and by institutionalized I mean more concerned with its own existence 
than the purpose from which it was formed. That's my hallmark of an institution or 
bureaucracy…more concerned about its own self-perpetuation than the purpose. LSC 
was no longer willing to risk its life for its mission. And that was a subtle set of changes, 
and it was always attacked by the right, and as our defense became less and less radical 
and became more of an ABA defense, we wound up giving up ground, to giving up 
ground, to giving up ground. And so at first there were restrictions on what we could do 
in lobbying but it was fairly minor, and then it became more major.165 
  
 Thus LSC began providing “minimum access” across the nation in 1977 with minor 
restrictions prohibiting “representation involving non-therapeutic abortions, school 
desegregation, the military draft and some juvenile cases.”166  
 LSC survived with the ABA’s “Access to Justice” strategy, but the lack of an independent 
board left it vulnerable to attacks.  By adopting the ABA defense, LSC attenuated its 
effectiveness in representing clients.  With constant Congressional threats and major funding 
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cuts in 1982, 1996 and 2012, LSC continued to compromise to survive.  Thus access to justice 
began to constrict and narrow.   As a result, 1981 was the first and last year the LSC met its 
“minimum access” goal.      
The Reagan Years 
  If Legal Services lawyers considered the Nixon administration unsympathetic to legal 
services, the Reagan administration was openly hostile.  The Republicans of Nixon’s years were 
different from those of Reagan’s.  “Legal assistance for the poor, when properly provided, is 
one of the most constructive ways to help them to help themselves,” said Nixon.  He added, 
“Justice is served far better and differences are settled more rationally within the system than 
on the streets.”167  Nixon had at least signed the LSC Act.  Reagan wanted to eliminate LSC 
altogether.  In fact, he chose not to reauthorize the corporation, and his budget request did not 
include any money for LSC.  Ultimately, Reagan was unable to sever LSC’s financial lifeline and 
his “zero funding” plan failed.168  Other than packing the board with antagonists, LSC was 
insulated from the Executive Branch; and failure of reauthorization did not deny Congress the 
right to appropriate funds.  LSC survived in 1982, but suffered from a 25% cut in funding.  
Congress decreased funding from $321 million to $241 million for the fiscal year.  Many Legal 
Services offices closed or reduced staff, resulting in a major reduction in services.  According to 
the NLADA, in 1980 there were 1,406 local field program offices, employing 6,559 attorneys and 
2,901 paralegals. In 1982 only 1,121 offices remained; and by 1983, employed only 4,766 
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attorneys and 1,949 paralegals.”169 The loss of legal services occurred at the worst time.  The 
energy crisis of 1979 and ensuing US recession resulted in reduced federal welfare support.170  
By mid-1981 the US unemployment rate reached double digits.  High unemployment and 
reduced government support led to an increased poverty population and demand for legal 
services.   
 Unable to abolish LSC directly, Reagan packed the board with fiscally conservative allies.  
By December 30, 1981 they held a majority, and began a string of attacks.  The first attack came 
in the form of a grant “freeze.”  Convening on New Year’s Eve, the board voted to hold all 
grants for 1982.  The “freeze” came too late.  Foreseeing an attack, President Dan Bradley pre-
approved the grants in November, just before his term ended.  Missing that opportunity, the 
Reagan board voted to refund all field programs, with the exception that funding for support 
centers last only a few months.  Congress rejected the board’s actions.  Intent on sustaining 
funding for LSC programs, a Democratic-controlled Congress implemented a set of “riders” 
which ensured funding for grantees and support centers for 1983 at FY1982 levels.171    
 In 1983, the conservative board used a different tactic.  LSC President Donald P. Bogard 
created two new headquarter offices: Compliance and Review and Program Development.  The 
Office of Compliance and Review (OCR) assumed responsibility for monitoring field programs.  
The new program’s goal was to identify violations of rules and regulations.  Based on violations, 
the OCR had the power to sanction programs and terminate their grants.  To fully investigate 
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any violations, the OCR required more information.  Bogard and the board began scrutinizing 
the activities of grantees by increasing the complexity of the grantee refunding forms and 
requiring that grantees produce detailed answers to new questionnaires.172These new forms 
and questionnaires, amounting to volumes of documentation, were given to Senators Orrin 
Hatch (R-UT) and Jeremiah Denton (R-AL).  Armed with new information, Hatch, Denton, and 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) set out to uncover illegal activities within legal services 
programs.  Bogard proceeded to raid the programs.  According to John Arango, 
[There was] very intensive and hostile monitoring.  Big teams would come out with 
former FBI agents to monitor the programs, they'd stay for a week, they were very 
difficult people to deal with; they frequently invented regulations on the spot.  It was a 
very hard time for program boards and staff, particularly those that were committed to 
providing high quality aggressive representation.173 
 
Programs in violation could be defunded within 90 days, (Senators Orrin Hatch of Utah and 
Jeremiah Denton of Alabama were responsible for streamlining the defunding process).     
 Hatch and Denton presented their findings in a booklet, Robber Barons of the Poor?  
They claimed to find secret lobbying slush funds, an illegal grass roots political apparatus, and 
proof that funds were being diverted from the poor to promote radical social agendas.  
“Politicians dwell on the promise of the programs, not their performance;” warned Hatch, “the 
Legal Services Corporation was an unknown entity…there was no uniform record keeping…no 
systematic records of the number of clients served, the types of cases handled, or the cost of 
litigation.”174  Following up at the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, the GAO 
reported, “we didn’t have authority to settle the accounts of the Corporation, and it is possible 
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for the Corporation to willfully violate the law…there is not significant enforcement 
authority.”175  Hatch then asked Congress to amend the LSC Act to include criminal and civil 
procedures against any program engaging in prohibited activities.176   
 In 1984, the conservative LSC added more restrictions and greater scrutiny on 
eligibility.177 LSC required programs to report large expenditures and to begin including local 
private bars when setting program priorities.  LSC also prohibited grantees from lobbying on 
their behalf.178 According to Earl Johnson, “LSC staff…sought to close down some of the 
programs that supported a broader vision of access to justice.”179  That same year, LSC’s 
discovery of a discrepancy in funds controlled by the “Reggie” program administrator led to full 
investigations.  These investigations, bordering on attacks, forced Howard University to rid itself 
of the program.  After a 14-year run that enlisted the service of more than 2,300 high-quality 
lawyers, the Reggie program came to an end.     
 Bogard and LSC staff also attacked the controversial Western Center of Law and Poverty 
(WCLP), a program that vowed to provide “legal representation before every institution that 
shapes their [clients] lives.”180  Five years earlier, Senator Hatch asked the GAO to investigate 
the Center over violations of legislative activities.  No wrongdoing was found.  In 1984, Bogard 
made a similar claim that the Center was violating LSC restrictions.  After looking into the 
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matter Judge Ralph Drummond, a neutral Administrative Judge, disagreed, ruling that the 
Center only gathered information and had not violated any restrictions.  Bogard denied funding 
anyway.  Congress was forced once again to add “affirmative riders” for FY1985, this time to 
guarantee funding for the WCLP.  Shortening the leash, a perturbed Congress also required LSC 
to notify the House and Senate before proposing any new regulations.   
 Reagan won his second election in a landslide.  On the eve of Reagan’s second 
administration, Don Bogard resigned.  LSC had survived a conservative LSC president, and “for a 
fifth year in a row,” said Johnson, “LSC would limp into 1985 with a board of ‘recess 
appointees.’”181  (“Affirmative riders” restricted the full power of “recess appointees.”  Thus the 
board’s power was limited in restricting activities of grantees).  By July, 1985 Reagan had a confirmed 
board; however, because confirmation occurred after January 1, 1985, the appropriations bill, 
including the “affirmative riders” and guaranteed funding, stood.  Congress increased the LSC 
budget by 10.9%, a total of $305 million. 
 Johnson credits the Preservation of Legal Services for the Poor for influencing members 
of Congress to defeat the LSC board’s attempt to restrict program lawyers.  Appalled at how LSC 
conducted its public meetings and how hostile the board treated others, three State Bar 
Presidents, Michael Greco from Massachusetts, Jonathan Ross of New Hampshire, and William 
Whitehurst of Texas, and bar executive Gail Kinney formed the Preservation.  “What we were 
seeing,” Ross recalled, “were Ronald Reagan nominees to the LSC Board who were basically 
trying to bring about an end to the LSC.”182  The new “bar leaders” organization managed to get 
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every State Bar Association to support them.  This “grass roots” effort at advocacy could not be 
barred by any restrictions from LSC or Congress.  According to Earl Johnson, every year more 
and more senators and Congressmen voted to support continuation of LSC funding, a trend 
attributable to bar leaders for the Preservation of Legal Services for the Poor.  Johnson also 
credits Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH) for protecting Legal Services.  Rudman used staff 
member Tom Polgar to attend and report on LSC board meetings.  Whenever LSC planned 
anything detrimental to legal services, Rudman introduced “affirmative riders” to reverse board 
decisions.  Hence the Senate micromanaged the LSC board.  This was the case in 1986, when 
board member Pepe Mendez proposed a restructuring and defunding of support centers.183  
The motion passed.  Appropriations legislation for FY1987 effectively rescinded the vote with 
an affirmative rider requiring funding of national and state support centers (back-up centers) at 
FY1986 levels.   
 In 1987, Congress added a “negative rider” that prohibited Legal Services lawyers from 
representing any kind of abortion case.  That same year, the Shumway Amendment from the 
House attacked LSC funding.  “With an accumulated debt of well over $2 trillion,” argued 
Norman Shumway of California, “I believe that we have a solemn obligation to subject every 
program which is sponsored or subsidized by the Federal Government to the very strictest kind 
of scrutiny.”184  With a 90 rating on John Birch Society’s conservative index, Shumway 
represented California’s San Joaquin Valley, home of large agricultural businesses and 
opponents of CRLA as well as thousands of poor migrant farm workers who needed LSC 
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services.  He argued that LSC had never been reauthorized by Reagan.   Shumway lost the vote 
by a 2-to-1 margin.  Shortly after the House attack, LSC Chairman Clark Durant proposed 
defunding support centers, with all funding going only to direct legal services for the poor.  The 
motion passed.  Yet again, however, the full Congress instructed LSC to fund the support 
centers for FY1988 at FY1987 levels.  For FY1989, the Reagan administration made a budget 
request of only $250 million, an amount $55 million dollars less than the previous year—the 
exact amount needed to fund the support centers. The Reagan administration planned to 
deplete LSC monies by first subsidizing field programs and then reasoning a lack of funds for 
support centers.   
 In a last ditch effort, Reagan used the earlier “McCollum amendment” to curb LSC 
activity.  The 1982 amendment mandated that LSC grantee boards (comprised of a majority of 
lawyers) consist only of those lawyers chosen by state and local bar associations.  Furthermore, 
Bar Associations had to represent the majority of lawyers in the area.  This rule specifically 
excluded lawyer members suggested by the NAACP, law schools and Community Action 
agencies.   On December 30, 1988, LSC President Terry Wear put all grantees on short funding.  
Instead of annual grants, field programs received four-month grants.  “Twenty-two field 
programs and 10 national support centers were placed on two-month funding because they 
didn’t comply with the new McCollum amendment…another eight…received one-month 
funding because of ‘discrepancies’.”185   
 Although Reagan’s term ended in January 1989, his appointees continued to attack the 
LSC.  In 1989, Board Chairman Michael Wallace hired the Cooper Law firm to investigate the 
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constitutionality of LSC.  Wallace spent $100,000 of the corporation’s money to do so.  
Ultimately, the board was pressured to withdraw the challenge.  On August 8, an article in the 
Washington Post, “Stop us before we sue again” summarized the Reagan administration’s 
attempt to abolish LSC, “The President should appoint a new board that won’t be ashamed to 
serve,” read the article, “as for the rest...its time they were retired and replaced by those who 
will spend their energies, and the public money, meeting the needs of the poor.”    
 Wear continued four-month short-funding into 1989, with support centers on a month-
to-month basis. Wear believed in the idea of competitive bidding, and reasoned that private 
law firms could replace current programs.  In short, he aimed to substitute judicare for salaried 
programs. In any case, his plan would eliminate funding to established legal aid programs, 
especially those programs still advocating for the poor.  According to an article in the New York 
Times, “competitive bidding, would in fact supplant aggressive local programs with tamer 
grantees.”186  “The last of the Reagan boards,” Johnson observed, “sought to restructure the 
delivery system to narrow the range of services it offered poor people before handing it over to 
an unknown commodity, the first Bush board.”187  Reagan’s forces had succeeded in narrowing 
access to justice by limiting legal aid lawyers who engaged in class action suits or administrative 
and legislative advocacy, as well as placing restrictions on abortion and undocumented 
immigrant litigation. 
 In a 1986 response to Senator Phil Gramm’s (R-TX) unsuccessful proposal to defund LSC, 
Senator Paul Simon (D-IL)  made a strong case for the continuance of LSC for future generations 
to come, 
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My friend from Texas cites abuses.  He could get two of his students to write a book 
about abuses in the field of agriculture…in any field.  Obviously, you can get a book 
about abuses in the field of religion…The gauge of something is not whether there are 
occasional abuses but whether the program as a whole is a good program and a needed 
program…I think there are ways of solving our budget problems without reaching down 
to the poorest of the poor, as this amendment does.188 
 
 Together, with negative riders, a constitutional challenge, and the ABA's silence, the 
Reagan administration used zero-based budgeting, aggressive and intimidating investigations, 
swift enforcement of violations, and short-funding tactics to successfully narrow the range of 
legal services available to the poor.  In addition to thwarting the effectiveness of LSC-funded 
programs, efforts were made to establish alternatives to legal aid such as judicare and private 
attorney involvement.  Thus, in the late 1980s LSC began eliminating its programs’ reliance on 
federal funds, as its officials searched for private non-LSC funds such as IOLTA and pushed for 
private attorney involvement as an alternative to the legal aid attorney.     
IOLTA 
 LSC President Bogard created Program Development (PD) in 1983 to promote the use of 
outside funding and find alternative means to providing legal services.  Considered a positive 
alternative funding source, “Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts” (IOLTA) emerged during the 
Reagan administration.189   IOLTA won bipartisan support because it increased money for legal 
aid programs but did not require federal funding to do so.  Gaining traction in 1983 in Florida 
and then in California, IOLTA had become the leading private supplier of funding for legal 
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services.  To date all 50 states and the District of Columbia have IOLTA.  Notably, IOLTA is 
dependent upon interest rates, consequently during recessions and in deflationary periods 
when interest rates drop, so do the amounts of IOLTA money.  
Private Attorney Involvement (PAI) 
 According to Houseman, most legal services programs used a staff attorney system; 
however, in the early 1980s, the ABA and LSC looked to add Private Attorney Involvement (PAI) 
in providing legal services.190  In a nod to Reagan, the ABA adopted a resolution urging an LSC 
amendment to include opportunities for private attorneys in delivering legal services to the 
poor.  Beginning in 1981, before Congress could act, the LSC board and staff directed grantees 
to include PAI.  Originally requested at 10 percent of funds, by 1984 LSC required grantees to 
spend 12.5 percent of their funds on PAI.   Most programs increased their Pro Bono activities 
while some bolstered private contracts and or judicare.  In 1979, “sixteen experimental judicare 
programs were being funded at a total cost of over $1.5 million.”191 According to Houseman, 
PAI reduced the hostility of private lawyers, the ABA, and state and local bars toward the LSC.  
In 2004 LSC-funded programs closed 102,972 PAI cases of which approximately 71% were Pro 
Bono.  As of 2013, Pro Bono cases constituted over 82% with contracts and judicare closing 
16,910 cases.  A total of 30,465 attorneys accepted referrals.   
Other Services 
 During the Reagan Administration, the ABA also looked for alternative delivery 
methods such as “self-help, legal clinics, pre-paid and lawyer referral services, alternative 
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dispute resolution, and arbitration.”  192  Other than lawyer referral services which matched 
issues with attorneys for fees, these approaches provided alternatives to legal aid 
attorneys. Together, private non-LSC funds, PAI, and self-help employed Reginald Heber 
Smith’s suggestions of: Pro Se or “representing one’s self,” making the attorney’s services 
unnecessary, and providing an attorney through charitable means.  Other than legal clinics, 
most methods of these approaches are still in use today.   
 Over time, additional IOLTA funds, more attorneys through PAI, and alternative 
delivery methods increased LSC program resources, which ultimately expanded the reach of 
legal services in general.  Another development, the use of Paraprofessionals also helped 
meet the demand for legal services.  Paraprofessional services involving paralegals existed 
before LSC and Program Development’s search for alternatives.  By 1978 “the total number 
of…paralegals involved in legal services work in the United States [was] reported to be 1,500, 
compared to 3,700 lawyers.”193  The use of paralegals under the umbrella of an attorney greatly 
increased manpower by cutting down on employee costs.194  
The Bush Administration 
 According to the NLADA, “By 1990, the poor were served by many fewer legal services 
attorneys than in 1981, when the modest level of minimum access was briefly achieved.”195  In 
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other words, Reagan succeeded in narrowing access to justice below the minimum access 
levels.  By President George H.W. Bush’s Administration, a concerned ABA took an active role in 
vetting board nominees in favor of LSC’s future.  The ABA assigned the Standing Committee on 
Legal Aid to conduct confidential reviews.  Although not overtly hostile, President Bush tried to 
flat line the LSC budget each year while Congress continued to appropriate greater amounts.  
By contrast, Bush’s nominees greatly eased the tension between the LSC and its grantees.  
Senator Rudman, who had done so much to help LSC, described the new nominees as “fair-
minded people who did not show antipathy for legal services.”196   Board Chairman George 
Witgraff was integral in building better relations between LSC, private lawyers, and LSC 
grantees.  Witgraff invited legal aid lawyers, board members, and clients throughout the 
country to attend scheduled board meetings.  The meetings provided presentations and 
important information about what LSC was all about.  By providing new information, LSC helped 
many board members realize that LSC lawyers were not “bomb throwers” but hardworking 
professionals.  Even Norman Shumway (an earlier opponent) spoke about the learned benefits 
of LSC.  He pointed out three major LSC accomplishments:  appropriations had grown from 
$295 million in 1990 to $357 million in 1993; LSC had increased oversight of programs (leading 
to decreased paperwork); and LSC and grantees developed better relationships—a result of 
annual joint conferences by Witgraff.  In addition, LSC began basing some grants on merit and 
innovation, a nod to the OEO days. 
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Republican Revolution 
 In 1992 proponents believed that President Bill Clinton’s election would mean greater 
funding and security for LSC.  After all, his wife had served as an LSC chairperson.  With 
Clinton’s nominees supporting a strong and broad role for LSC, along with a huge increase in 
appropriations reaching $400 million for FY1994 and FY1995, the future looked bright.  
Unexpectedly, the “Republican Revolution” changed everything.  During the 1994 congressional 
elections, Republicans gained 54 seats in the House and 8 in the Senate.  By January 1995 
Republicans won control of both houses for the first time since 1952.  Speaker of the House 
Newt Gingrich (R-GA) spearheaded the revolution.    
 The following year, Congress passed the greatest restrictions on legal aid delivery in LSC 
history.  Former Executive Director of the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) Alan 
Houseman described the political parallel.197  “In much the same way as the Reagan 
Administration in the early 1980s, the leadership of the new Congress, under Gingrich, 
committed itself to the elimination of LSC and ending federal funding for legal services.”198  
 Described as the “glide path to elimination,” Gingrich and the House planned to 
eventually eliminate funding for LSC.199  A bipartisan majority in Congress supported funding for 
LSC, but not before a compromise with major reforms was struck.  Both the House and Senate 
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added prohibitions to the appropriations bill.  Restrictions included prohibitions on such 
political activities as voter registration and organizing activities within labor unions, etc.  
Grantees could not lobby government offices, agencies, or legislative bodies.  Lawyers could not 
solicit clients.  With the exception of Indian Tribal Courts, lawyers could not take criminal cases, 
abortion cases, military cases, assisted suicide cases, or cases involving the desegregation of 
schools. Lawyers could no longer perform class actions.  Lawyers could no longer represent 
prisoners, people evicted from public housing due to criminal charges of illegal drugs, and with 
limited exception, could not represent aliens.  Congress also prohibited most activities 
promoting welfare reform and other liberal agenda items.200 
 Houseman’s Securing Equal Justice for All details additional changes.  Funding for 
grantees was to be based solely on a census of the poor and the staff needed to administer a 
timekeeping system.  Grantees were restricted from receiving attorney’s fees, and could no 
longer use funds to pay dues or to sue LSC.  In addition, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
was granted greater power to perform audits, and LSC was given greater access to client 
records.201    
 Along with the restrictions, Congress slashed LSC’s budget by more than 30 percent.  
FY1996 appropriations for LSC included $269.4 million for basic field programs, $1.5 million for 
the OIG and $7.1 million for management and administration.  Cuts in funding led to a loss of 
300 local programs, and 900 attorneys—an estimated loss of 300,000 cases annually.   
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 To make matters worse, Congress not only placed restrictions on LSC-funded money, 
but prohibited LSC recipients from using public or private funds for LSC-restricted activities as 
well.202  In other words, any program receiving LSC funds must apply LSC restrictions to all non-
LSC funds.  “Congress...determined that federal funds should go only to those legal services 
programs that focused on individual representation and concentrated on clients’ day-to-day 
legal problems,” noted Houseman, “while broader efforts to address the more general systemic 
problems of the client community and to ameliorate poverty should be left to those entities 
that did not receive LSC funds.”203In addition, Congress eliminated funding for support centers.   
End of Support Centers 
 Before the LSC bill passed, the House Committee tacked on the “Green Amendment.”  
Congresswoman Edith Green argued that research, training, technical assistance, and 
information clearinghouse services should not be part of the lawyers’ position, but a service by 
LSC if necessary.  In this manner, law reform could be reined in and ultimately eliminated.  In 
short, the amendment ended grants and funding for back-up centers.  But due to vague 
wording, it did not have the effect Republicans thought it would.  It did not prohibit back-up 
centers or legal research on behalf of litigation; after all, research was part of a lawyer’s work.  
In the end, the LSC board agreed to conduct training and technical assistance as well as provide 
clearinghouse services in house.  As for research, LSC began referring to back-up centers as 
“support centers” and offered contracts instead of grants to continue their work. In this 
manner, LSC held some control over the research.   During the Reagan years, these centers 
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survived mainly because of “affirmative riders” attached to the LSC appropriations bills.  These 
“riders” and LSC-funding for support centers lasted until the “Republican Revolution” and 
ensuing major attack on LSC.  New restrictions ended funding for the support centers.  Without 
federal money only a few of the national support centers survived; by expanding their focus 
beyond poverty they were able to attract other financing.  As of 2007 only 12 state programs 
were former LSC-funded support centers.  According to Houseman,   
State and national support centers; the national Clearinghouse for Legal Services, which 
published the poverty law journal The Clearinghouse Review; and various training 
programs, had developed quality standards, engaged in delivery research, provided 
training to support legal services advocacy, and served as the infrastructure that linked 
all of the LSC-funded providers into a single national legal services program.204 
 
The link had been severed. 
State-based Planning 
 In anticipation of federal cuts, LSC embarked on a new approach that emphasized 
statewide delivery systems.  The plan involved a unified state justice system that included LSC 
and non-LSC service providers—Pro Bono programs, law schools, private bars and others 
working in collaboration.  Focus shifted from local control to a state’s collective responsibility 
for providing legal services.  LSC promoted the use of centralized telephone systems, a sense of 
equitable distribution among programs and areas, and access to both urban and rural clients to 
achieve the goal of this new state-level advocacy system.   
 With new restrictions on non-LSC funds, many states developed separate non-LSC 
funded legal services providers.  In fact, many of today’s non-LSC funded programs are “spin-
offs” of LSC recipients.  By remaining unrestricted, “spin-off” programs could continue engaging 
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in class actions, working on welfare reform, assisting aliens and prisoners, and more, so long as 
their new funders allowed them to.  Thus many states offered parallel legal services programs.  
In 2007, 16 states operated parallel programs and in some jurisdictions the private bars 
provided basic legal services.  
 LSC also encouraged states to consolidate multiple local LSC-funded programs into 
regional or statewide programs, a process described as “merger mania.”  Due to mergers and 
overall reconfiguration, the number of programs decreased:  from 1995 to 1998, the number of 
LSC basic field and Native American programs fell from 288 to 261, as 27 programs were 
merged.205  In 1995 there were 325 programs; by the end of merger mania in 2006, there were 
138.  In 2015 there were 134 programs.   
Program Changes 
 Since the statewide initiative began, an increasing number of states have created 
“Access to Justice” commissions, which include representatives from the courts, bars, legal 
services and more.206  Thus, as part of access to justice, many programs work with a partnership 
of stakeholders within the justice system of each state.  Many programs have also looked for 
new sources of money.  Aside from private sources, programs sought and received new sources 
of non-LSC funding under VAWA, (Violence Against Women Act), the Housing and Urban 
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Development (HUD), the IRS, and other federal agencies.  Programs also secured money 
through state and local governments or agencies.207    
 Programs also changed the manner in which they delivered services.  In the 1990s 
programs created telephone hotlines to “screen cases, provide legal advice or brief service, and 
make referrals to private attorneys and other sources of legal assistance.”208  In the twenty-first 
century, with the advent of the information age and internet growth, access improved further, 
as programs built websites to provide substantive legal information (in multiple languages),  
online intake systems, online forms, videos, chat capability  and simplified step-by-step 
instructions.  In addition, many courts offered similar services along with electronic filing and 
payment options.  Not surprisingly, while technology played a large role in facilitating access to 
legal services, it has not dramatically increased access to justice. 
 In the 1990s a grass roots effort to improve access to justice for the poor slowly 
coalesced into a nascent movement dubbed “Access 2 Justice.”  Stakeholders realized that 
adding more lawyers was not reducing the justice gap.209  Founder and leader of Access 2 
Justice (A2J) Richard Zorza worked with stakeholders and existing programs to leverage 
technology in promoting information, and supporting self-represented litigants.  From this early 
movement emerged A2J, Pro Bono Net, and Law Help, which together provide interactive 
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online document assembly, Pro Bono information including a pleading bank, program portals, 
and websites respectively.  Joining the technology boom in 1997, the ABA committee on the 
Delivery of Legal Services started its first email listserv. By 1988, the OIG supported an A2J 
project, which led to LSC’s Technology Initiative Grant or TIG program.  According to LSC, the 
technology initiative has funded 570 projects totaling $46 million.  The program is effective in 
promoting the goal of access to justice.210    
 Programs also provide other services such as legal education workshops, referral 
services, and Pro Se self-help materials.   In 2013 grantees made referrals to over 233,000 other 
legal service providers, over 285,000 lawyers (LRIS & individual), and over 52,000 (non-legal) 
human or social services programs.  Over 305,000 people attended legal education 
presentations, and 49,672 people went to Pro Se clinics or workshops.    
The End of Restrictions 
  The Republican Revolution and ensuing restrictions buttressed the Reagan era 
initiatives of private funding, private attorney involvement, and alternative delivery methods of 
Pro Se and self-help as programs fought to continue providing the same level of access to 
justice for clients.  With decreased funding and added restrictions, Access to Justice required a 
comprehensive safety net for the poor—something other than LSC-funded programs.   
 No new restrictions have been implemented to date.  Opponents continue with 
moderate attacks on LSC, but after the 1996 prohibitions, growing oversight, and monitoring of 
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program performance, there is little left to contest.211  According to LSC, “since 1996, bipartisan 
support in Congress for LSC has continued to grow.”212  From the $278 million in FY1996, 
appropriations for LSC slowly increased to $283 million the following year, with strong increases 
in FY1996, FY2001, FY2007, FY2009, to a recalibrated high-water mark of $420 million in 2010. 
Notably, LSC removed restrictions on collecting attorney’s fees in 2010.  
 According to Alan Houseman and Linda Perle, the LSC restrictions of 1996 diminished 
the capacity of legal services programs and staff to “effectively represent low-income persons 
in the courts and before other forums that affect their rights and responsibilities.” However, 
they argue that “over 95% of the work done in legal services in 1995 can continue today and 
over 98% of the cases brought to court in 1995 can still be brought.”213   
Diminished Capacity 
 Although Houseman’s and Perle’s statistics indicate that LSC programs can continue 
doing 95 percent of their work and bring 98 percent of their cases, they do not diminish the 
catastrophic impact that restrictions have had on narrowing the poor’s access to justice.  “Not 
being able to do class actions means that there is a whole level of remedy that is not available 
to clients,” says AnnaMarie Johnson, “there are things that we would like to correct, but you 
can’t do it with one individual.”214 For instance, Johnson describes a major problem currently 
afflicting the process:  
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There is a nationwide organization that is scamming people on foreclosure and 
foreclosure assistance… what they can do with the one client is moot them out by giving 
them their money back and correcting the problem...what we need to do is have a class 
action…so you can actually get at their business practices and put them out of 
business.215 
 
A restriction on class actions prevents programs from effectively combating such problems as 
consumer fraud and predatory lending practices, as well as any other act that adversely affects 
a multitude of clients.   Her example describes a real inability for legal services to stop corrupt 
practices, and so the scam continues. 
 Restrictions on lobbying also limit a program’s ability to help their clients.  “Sometimes 
our clients’ voices need to be heard at the legislature,” as Johnson correctly observed, “the 
problems and issues that the legislature is putting through, how it affects the poor and what 
they can do to help the poor is not being heard…they have affectively silenced us on that.”216 
According to Jon Sasser, who currently lobbies on behalf of the poor in Nevada, much of the 
2015 state legislative session involved defensive work.  Sasser worked to “cure” or amend 
Assembly Bill (AB) 386, Senate Bill (SB) 58, and AB 195, among others.  AB 386 established 
procedures to deal with squatters, but made unintentional changes to landlord tenant law.  
Sasser consulted with tenant advocates while working closely on drafting and amending the bill 
with interested parties.  SB 58 initially allowed additional parties to view information related to 
children within the juvenile court system or in protective custody.  Sasser worked to 
successfully limit the bill to only those people within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. AB 
                                                          
215
 Ibid.  
216
 Ibid. 
90 
 
195 removed requirements on deficiency judgments in foreclosures. 217  His work also limited 
the scope of judgment to commercial property only.  
 Sasser labels bills as “cured,” “concerned” and “killed”.  In 2015, under this taxonomy he 
was concerned about SB 239, SB 193 and other bills.  SB 239 shortened the timeline after 
foreclosures to sue for wrongful foreclosure, and SB 193 removed requirements to pay 
overtime for hours worked in excess of 8 hours in any workday for minimum wage workers.  
Sasser also helped to “kill” bills such as SB 123, AB 228, AB 102 and SB 255.  SB 123 would have 
removed restrictions on payday lenders, AB 228 would have allowed GPS tracking devices to be 
installed in cars for people with poor credit, and AB 102 would have allowed an initial waiver of 
reasonable efforts to be used as proof in a termination of parental rights trial, while SB 255 
would have required putative fathers to register with the state or forfeit parental rights.218  
 Sasser’s work provides examples of how legislative advocacy is critical in protecting the 
poor and Nevadans in general.  Without advocacy to amend or terminate harmful laws, the 
problems of the poor will only multiply and legal services programs will be further taxed to 
meet the increased demand for their services regarding family, juvenile, employment, 
consumer, and housing issues.  Today, LSC prohibits recipients from engaging in legislative 
lobbying activities including agency rulemaking or advocacy training.  Unless recipients are 
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invited to participate in providing an opinion on behalf of the poor, they are restricted from 
advocating for them. 
 Additional restrictions limit the number of eligible clients.  According to Johnson, “there 
are plenty of organizations to take up restricted cases such as abortion, or euthanasia,” but 
funding and resources are limited.219  There still remains a section of the poor unable to afford 
representation such as the military, prisoners, criminals, those charged with possessing illegal 
drugs, and immigrants.  In such cases, for example, vulnerable immigrants have no legal 
recourse against workplace abuses and “efforts to help prisoners reenter society are needlessly 
postponed.”220 Ultimately, an LSC program’s survival and ability to service all clients relies on 
funding, and the restrictions placed on that funding diminishes the legal services attorney’s 
capacity to effectively represent the poor in court and other forums.   
 Together, inadequate funding and added restrictions negatively affect access to justice 
for the poor.  As Chair John G. Levi remarked at the LSC Board of Directors meeting in 2015, “In 
its first year…the fledgling LSC was allocated—in inflation-adjusted terms—more than $468 
million, rising three years later to its all-time high of what today would be $880 million.”221  In 
2013, Congress appropriated $340,876,165 for LSC, well below the 1976 level.   The effect is 
stark.   In 1971 the OEO-SP served approximately 1.2 million clients annually with an inflation-
adjusted $320 million.  In 2013 LSC programs closed a cumulative 758,689 cases with 
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appropriations of $340.8 million.  According to Levi, in 2013 nearly one in three Americans, or 
96 million people qualified for LSC services.222   
 How is it that funding and poverty population increased while the number of cases 
closed decreased?  Since statistics reflect no major change in the type of casework being done 
since the OEO-LSP days, the answer lies primarily in funding and reporting.223  Ominously, in 
2013 the entire $340.8 million allocated never reached the field programs.224   The 
appropriations act reduced total funding to $316 million.  Notably six percent of the money 
allocated went to migrant and Native American work—the types of cases that require more 
travel and research, as clients are difficult to locate and are typically in distant rural areas.  
 Lower case numbers also reflect a decreasing number of LSC-funded cases.225  From 
1996 to 2013, the percentage of LSC funds to non-LSC-funds provided to programs overall 
decreased from 59.67 percent to 38.73 percent.  An increase in non-LSC funds is generally 
considered to be good, but non-LSC funds are particularly vulnerable to market conditions.  In 
2010, non-LSC funding reached its highest point at approximately $578.7 million.  Since the sub-
prime mortgage crisis in 2009, non-LSC funds have fallen, due largely to a decline in real estate 
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transactions made by lawyers, which contributes the largest amount to IOLTA accounts.  IOLTA 
accounts also rise and fall with the federal rate, which the Federal Reserve slashed in response 
to the recession.  Thus IOLTA, the second largest contributor to legal services, declined 
dramatically.  Along with the decrease in IOLTA funds, federal, state and other non-LSC funds 
decreased.  By 2013, non-LSC funding fell to $542 million, of which IOLTA accounted for only 5.6 
percent.   
 LSC’s restriction on the use of non-LSC funds extends further each year, as LSC’s 
percentage of contribution to total funds diminishes.  According to the Brennan Center, “the 
restriction is an unnecessary federal overreach that interferes with choices of state, local and 
private charitable donors about how to spend their money.”226 This long reach into non-LSC 
funds not only places restrictions on programs, but can affect the efficiency and effectiveness of 
legal services in general.  As mentioned, in 1996 many “spin-off” programs were created in 
response to that particular restriction, leading to parallel legal services within states.  As part of 
the Nevada Access to Justice Commission, Justice Douglas meets with providers regularly in an 
effort to fill gaps, and prevent overlap or duplication of legal services.  Why?  Because an 
overlap signifies an ineffective use of money and manpower, which could be used to provide 
missing services.  Justice Douglas would prefer a unified statewide legal services program, but 
describes the problem associated with it, 
One can’t do it by itself.  In one case, if we had nothing but pure open-ended providers 
doing it right now, we wouldn’t be getting the federal money.  And if we didn’t have 
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those folks who are doing it without the federal restrictions, they would have more 
money but then there would be a number of things they couldn’t do.227   
 
Without restrictions, programs could augment rather than cut their services.  By sharing funds, 
they could eliminate unnecessary overhead, administrative, and personnel costs, and put their 
cost-savings into filling gaps in services.   
 Another argument against restrictions is that they implement internal contradictions 
that may diminish professional capacity.  Lisa Wirtz argues that “Professionalism requires 
lawyers to transcend the bottom-line orientation of their profession and to serve such 
overarching goals as social justice and public interest…Professionalism highlights qualities 
including autonomy and honesty.”228  Her opinion suggests a conflict between LSC restrictions 
and a lawyer’s Canon of Ethics.  This dilemma first surfaced with MFY, the Neighborhood 
Lawyer Program, when lay members attempted to interfere with a lawyer’s conduct.  As noted 
earlier, in 1963 Judge Florence Kelley upheld the “importance of maintaining the purity of the 
relationship between a lawyer and his client,” even if it meant jeopardizing the organization’s 
relationships.229  This raised an important question: does a denial of clients’ rights due to 
ineligibility satisfy the requirements of a legal services attorney’s canon of ethics?   
A Matter of Right 
 When Justice Earl Johnson, Jr. (Ret.) delivered his keynote speech at the Pathways to 
Justice Conference in 2008 he was struck by a certain symmetry: “44 years of justice for the 
poor being a matter of private charity, followed by another 44 years of justice for the poor 
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being a matter largely of discretionary government funding.”230  And on the horizon, he 
believed, was a third phase: justice for the poor as a matter of right. 
 A year later, LSC issued a Justice Gap report identifying the gap between available 
resources for legal services and the legal needs of the poor, in other words, the unmet civil legal 
needs.  The report stated that “nationally, on average, only one legal aid attorney is available to 
serve 6,415 low-income people,” well below the minimum access goal of two lawyers per 
10,000 people.231  In 2009, the report indicated that for every client helped by an LSC-funded 
program one person was turned away.  “That’s a low statistic today,” says AnnaMarie Johnson, 
“It’s much higher.  I think that for every one person assisted five are turned away.”232  The 
report also tracked an increasing number of poor people appearing in state courts without 
attorneys, with an increasing number of unrepresented litigants in family and housing courts.233 
The majority of the poor were not receiving counsel.  Finally, the report recognized that not all 
of the poor’s legal problems were even addressed with the help of an attorney.   
 On what horizon did Justice Earl Johnson see justice as a matter of right?  Did he 
imagine a civil Gideon? According to Sasser,  “None of the legal aids, since Gideon v. 
Wainwright, have gotten any kind of funding, to my knowledge, to do criminal work…there was 
already a funding mechanism for criminal as the public defenders offices.” 234 A liberal 
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Democrat, lobbyist, and lifelong legal aid attorney, Sasser believes in implementing a civil 
Gideon. “If you are in civil law and not criminal law there is not a uniform right to have an 
attorney appointed to you.  So there are those radicals out there that would like to see there be 
a civil Gideon.  Then you have a right to an attorney in all kinds of cases.”235When asked if he 
would like to see a civil Gideon, Justice Douglas responded, “I would.  I don’t think I will.”  
Douglas believes it is a money issue.  “California has attempted it.  I see a number of states 
trying to get a civil Gideon,” says Douglas, “We barely commit sufficient resources to a criminal 
Gideon, in the true sense.   And we keep trying to figure out ways to limit [that]…to keep the 
cost down.”236  When asked if a civil Gideon was on the horizon, former Executive Director of 
Nevada Legal Services (NLS), Carolyn Worrell predicted, “Not in our lifetime are we going to see 
a Civil Gideon, unfortunately.” Current Executive Director of NLS, AnnaMarie Johnson 
answered, “I do.  I have no idea how to make that work in a real world manner. But I do believe 
in it.  I think we can make it work.” Similar to the others, Johnson’s response seemed to support 
the undertaking, but a civil Gideon, at least in the sense of a criminal Gideon with a right to an 
attorney, did not seem a present reality.  According to Justice Douglas, the closest civil Gideon 
is some kind of legal services program:        
What was put out there, whether it is funded by the United States government or by the 
state in some form: state direct grant of money or money from various filing fees, that 
appears, at least in the present, the way were are going to have a civil Gideon.  We will 
provide attorneys for people who are below this, and then by putting a Pro Bono 
position we can deal with those people who are actually above the cap limit, if they 
have certain kinds of cases falling in certain areas.237 
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 Without the right to civil legal representation, the duty of access to justice falls mainly 
upon legal services providers.  As the major funder of legal services programs in the United 
States, LSC’s mission is to “promote equal access to justice in our Nation and to provide high 
quality civil legal assistance to low income persons.”238  How well do LSC’s initiatives provide 
access to justice for the poor?  There are problems associated with the current corporation’s 
initiatives, which promote the use of non-LSC funds such as IOLTA, Private Attorney 
involvement or PAI such as Pro Bono, and Pro Se or self-help for clients with some form of legal 
education and information.   
 LSC’s restrictions on non-LSC funds harken back to the days of the Republican 
Revolution in the mid-1990s and have resulted in parallel programs with independent boards 
and administrations.  Aside from the additional overhead needed to operate multiple programs, 
more action is needed to coordinate legal services.   Justice Douglas explained the difficulty of 
cooperation, 
Each legal services organization, on both sides, is fighting for dollars.  They are fighting 
for their survival.  We know they get LSC money; they should be entitled to some of the 
state dollars.  We have one provider on the other side that says, “No, they get that 
money, they shouldn’t need any of this.”  But it’s like wait a minute, you’re not 
providing that service that they provide.  So we have stepped in…trying to coordinate 
and nurture, convince them to do it a different way.239 
 
LSC restrictions have resulted in parallel programs fighting with each other over money. 
 LSC’s Pro Se and Pro Bono initiatives also remind one of the Nixon, Reagan and Gingrich 
years, when Republicans, conservatives and others attacked the OEO-LSP and LSC respectively.  
They viewed federally-funded programs as welfare and promoted private-charity ideas such as 
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PAI.  Pro Se initiatives pushed for self-reliance based on the assumption that a person did not 
require assistance, because they were responsible for their own needs.  These initiatives deny 
the fact that some poor Americans require assistance from a federally-funded program.   
 The problem associated with Pro Se is that it does not secure justice for the poor.  The 
use of technology has increased the amount of information available to clients, and legal 
education from classes to pamphlets help educate them, but there is no guarantee that it 
results in a strong Pro Se defense.  According to Justice Douglas, litigation is very difficult for the 
poor, because they are always at a distinct disadvantage.  Not only must they understand 
formal pleadings, but if there is an attorney on the other side, they must know the procedure 
and rules of court.  “It’s like a three year-old playing a twelve year-old in basketball, and there is 
a height advantage,” mused Douglas, “ You know the outcome before it starts.”240 
 Self-representing clients because they do not know the procedures or rules of the court 
also slow down the court’s docket.  According to Bankruptcy Judge Linda Riegle, “sometimes 
clients just need someone to listen to them and tell them of their options, sometimes they 
need an attorney.”241  Judge Riegle who spends a majority of her time advising Pro Se litigants 
about their rights and the correct procedures, urged the use of attorneys to help streamline the 
court process.   
 LSC’s PAI initiative promotes the use of Pro Bono, but there is no guarantee that private 
attorneys will take the case, let alone be knowledgeable in that field of law.  “We have a lot of 
lawyers who say they are native domestic Pro Bono,” said Douglas, “Well, we have high 
powered attorneys, but not in family law.”  In other words, there is an educational process or 
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learning curve for Pro Bono. He continues, “Whether it’s just divorce, child custody or 
termination of parental rights, they need a mentor to get them through this.”   Therefore, some 
attorneys willing to take a case Pro Bono run the risk of inadequately representing clients or in 
some cases committing malpractice.   According to Douglas, sometimes Pro Bono is just a 
matter of a private family law attorney taking a Pro Bono case in family law.   He doesn’t see 
any comparatively better skill from a legal services attorney representing the poor, but 
recognizes, that “what they have is specialized knowledge in a specific area, where in some 
cases, the traditional for profit attorney doesn’t.”242  The concern for added reliance on private 
attorney involvement and less reliance on legal aid attorneys is that legal aid attorneys dedicate 
time and effort and increasing experience in resolving issues specifically related to the poor.  
This is not always the case with private attorneys.   
 LSC’s PAI and Pro Bono initiatives, the push for Pro Se or self-representation, and the 
assumed reliance on non-LSC funds are all part of the meshwork of civil legal representation for 
the poor.  The increased reliance on non-LSC funds, PAI and self-help suggest a legal services 
trajectory more in line with the private charity days of the early legal aid movement than the 
ideal of justice as a matter of right.  
 LSC’s vulnerability to political opinion, largely between two dominating political parties, 
the Democrats and Republicans, result in a clash between liberal and conservative viewpoints 
as well as a range of opinions in between.  According to Douglas, “part of the society we live in 
says ‘well you made your bed, so what?’ And the other says ‘the so what is, you have a right to 
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be treated fairly and equally before the law.”243  The historical battles over LSC resulted in a 
hobbled program; indeed, the early goal of “minimum access” is still not being met.  
Meanwhile, restrictions, limited LSC-funds, and an increasing percentage of non-LSC funds tied 
to economic downturns narrow equal access to justice for the poor.244 Nixon’s 1971 message to 
Congress, is still relevant today: it is the poor who pay for LSC’s indecision, 
Here each day the old, the unemployed, the underprivileged, and the largely forgotten 
people of our Nation may seek help. Perhaps it is an eviction, a marital conflict, 
repossession of a car, or misunderstanding over a welfare check—each problem may 
have a legal solution. These are small claims in the Nation’s eye, but they loom large in 
the hearts and lives of poor Americans.245 
 
 To date, LSC is the largest funder of civil legal aid for low-income Americans.  To fulfill its 
mission, the corporation distributes over 90 percent of its funding to 134 independent non-
profit legal aid programs throughout the nation.  As noted earlier, LSC provides funding through 
a competitive grant process, basing the size of grants upon the number of people living in 
poverty in a given state or geographic area.   Thus, LSC grantees exist in every state of the 
Union to provide America’s poverty population with legal counsel for civil issues.  Nevada Legal 
Services is the sole LSC recipient in Nevada.   
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Nevada Legal Services 
The only thing less popular than a poor person, these days, is a poor person with a lawyer. 
—Jon D. Asher, Legal Aid Society of Denver, 1995 
 
If you’re in a position where you can’t afford to attain an attorney, you’re not a full citizen. 
—Justice Michael Douglas, 2015 
Introduction 
 The history of Nevada Legal Services (NLS) parallels much of the history of the national 
movements from the legal aid societies to LSC-funded programs today.  NLS is a concrete 
example of how Congress and LSC limited access to justice by curtailing programs and the 
effective attorneys who attempted to challenge inequality and combat deep-rooted poverty in 
America.  Legal services attorneys were more effective in fighting poverty before the LSC 
restrictions of the 1970s and later decades.  The days of legal services, before the restrictions, 
demonstrate how legal services attorneys were more influential when the entire toolkit for 
lawyers was available.  Annelise Orleck’s Storming Caesars Palace describes the humiliation Las 
Vegas welfare mothers were subjected to and the animosity they met when attempting to 
secure federal and state aid.  At the time, legal services served as an empowering venue for 
clients such as Ruby Duncan who fought for justice and demanded greater rights for the poor.   
 A closer look at NLS reveals a group of legal services attorneys who believe in a civil 
Gideon and in their unique ways still fight a “War on Poverty.”  NLS today provides access to 
justice, but not as well as it did before Congress and LSC stifled the program’s effectiveness by 
placing restrictions on the type of legal activities attorneys could engage in and the kinds of 
clients they could represent.       
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 This chapter provides the history of the Clark County Legal Aid Society (CCLAS) and its 
association with Ruby Duncan and the Clark County Welfare Rights Organization (CCWRO), 
specifically with their work in the late 1960s to mid-1970s welfare rights movement.  It follows 
CCLAS during the OEO-LSP and LSC changes, up to its merger in 1982 with the Nevada Indian-
Rural Legal Services program to form Nevada Legal Services.  It addresses the LSC restrictions 
and the eventual "spin-off" of the Clark County Legal Services program (CCLS), which created 
parallel programs in Nevada.  Next, a history of general access to justice is provided to describe 
the work NLS has done through Nevada's population boom and housing crisis.  It then offers a 
brief examination of the dedicated employees and people who have provided legal services.  
Finally, it addresses the limitations of access to justice and the purging of effective legal services 
leaders such as former Executive Director Wayne Pressel.    
Clark County Legal Services 
 Sponsored by the Clark County Bar Association (CCBA) and initially funded by Justice of 
the Peace Art Olsen, the Clark County Legal Aid Society (CCLAS) formed in 1958 near the end of 
the legal aid movement.246  Before any OEO funding was available, CCLAS, like other legal aid 
societies, met the growing need for legal services through charitable donations by the United 
Fund, hosted fundraisers, and private donations of time and money.247  Within its first year, 
CCLAS screened approximately 575 applicants.  According to Jon Sasser, “[In] 1960 more than 
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1000 applicants had been processed with service provided to 350 individuals.”248  CCLAS began 
as a Pro Bono program.  The only paid position, the Executive Secretary, screened calls and 
referred prospective clients to volunteer CCBA members. CCLAS also created a lawyer referral 
service for those who could afford services (1961).  “In 1963 over 700 people were 
interviewed,” said Sasser, and in 1964, “844 persons sought aid [while another] 325 were 
directed to a panel of 43 [volunteer] attorneys.”249  A year later, future Governor and U.S. 
Senator Richard Bryan joined the board.250  Notably, Bryan was the first public defender in Las 
Vegas (1966).   
 In 1966, in response to the war on poverty, a neighborhood legal assistance program 
formed in Clark County. Staffed by two volunteer attorneys, the neighborhood program offered 
after hours (6 PM to 9PM) legal services to three low income neighborhoods within Las Vegas.  
With applications of 1,000 to 1,200 annually, the program became a strong candidate for OEO 
funds.  Nevertheless, LSP chose to fund CCLAS.  Why did OEO-LSP Director Bamberger, with an 
urgency to meet his funding deadline, choose CCLAS over a Great Society program?   Although 
the neighborhood program was designed to fight poverty, it was hardly established in the legal 
arena.  With a proven track record of helping the poor and a well-established and ongoing 
relationship with the local bar, CCLAS was the better choice, at least as a program that could be 
administered by attorneys.251  True to legal aid form, CCLAS struggled with the idea of using 
government funds.  In 1967, “after a bitter fight among members,” says Sasser, “the Clark 
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County Legal Aid Society applied to OEO for $20,000 in federal funds.”252  The OEO awarded a 
$22,000 joint grant to CCLAS and the Clark County Economic Opportunity Board. Together, the 
programs would use the grant to serve the 7,000 Clark County families with incomes of less 
than $3,000 a year.    
  In 1968, with OEO funds, CCLAS became a major program in Southern Nevada’s War on 
Poverty, with 13 attorneys and 8 low-income clients, the new board adopted the “Citizen 
Perspective.”   Mario Ventura, a staff Judge Advocate at Nellis Air Force Base, became the first 
paid CCLAS staff attorney.  With a full-time attorney and legal secretary, CCLAS offered a 
minimum of sixty-four hours of monthly service at anti-poverty centers located in the Westside, 
North Las Vegas and Henderson areas.  According to Ventura’s report, CCLAS helped 153 clients 
in the last quarter of 1968.253  Based on client needs, Ventura dealt with an increase in 
insurance and Social Security claims, as well as a rise in landlord/tenant issues.  Fourteen of 
Ventura’s cases went to court.254  In 1969, with Don Poole and future Director Mahlon Brown 
III, CCLAS officially offered a Pro Bono program and increased staff to meet the growing 
demand for legal aid.255  In 1970 CCLAS officially changed its name to Clark County Legal 
Services (CCLS).  That same year, quelling any concern that it might not be fighting a war on 
poverty, CCLS agreed to represent Ruby Duncan and thousands of other welfare recipients.256    
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Bogeyman and Bogeywoman 
 Welfare was anathema to the rugged individualist self-image and libertarian tradition 
that many white Silver State residents and politicians cherished.  In 1955, Nevada was the last 
state in the Union to accept Aid to Dependent Children (ADC).257  Although the ADC had its own 
issues, it offered some relief to poor single mothers.258  In 1967, Nevada once again was the last 
to institute the Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN).  Not until the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW) threatened to withdraw millions of federal funds, did Nevada 
offer an employment and training program for welfare recipients.  Nevada’s state government 
also resisted the Food Stamp program.259 According to Orleck, food stamps spared welfare 
recipients from a humiliating experience, as relief money was often used as a political 
patronage fund. As late as 1967, rations of surplus food were handed out at the Clark County 
courthouse. This staged ritual, designed to perpetuate a debt of gratitude for county 
commissioners, left welfare recipients standing in the Las Vegas heat without water or 
restrooms.  Food stamps offered recipients some dignity and the simple utility of purchasing 
nutritious foods, something other than cheese and peanut butter.     
 Nevada’s fear and loathing of welfare harkened back to the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries when Queen Elizabeth’s Laws were enacted to repress vagrancy and provide a means 
to publicly punish sturdy and able beggars in Britain and its colonies.  According to Lawrence 
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Friedman, in America “the sturdy beggar was one of the (mostly mythical) bogeyman of the 
nineteenth century.”260  Thus distinctions between the impotent and able-bodied were made in 
order to identify the “idle poor” and keep their hands out of government coffers.  The 
bogeyman existed well into the 1960s.  In 1966, California gubernatorial candidate Ronald 
Reagan claimed welfare encouraged poor behavior; it was “pay for play.” Unfortunately, the 
exaggerated focus on the few who exploited the welfare system resulted in an undignified 
response to the many in need.   Politicians and conservatives firmly embraced the ideas of “less 
eligibility” and David Ricardo’s “Iron Law of Wages,” which promoted the idea that conditions 
for the poor should be worse on welfare than off welfare, and pushed the amount of aid below 
subsistence levels for fear welfare would promote dependency.261    Thus, the nineteenth 
century mindset that pauperism was a result of laziness, immorality, or some moral defect, 
thrived in the Las Vegas heat, through the scrutiny, embarrassment, and stigma of welfare.  “In 
1967, Congress gave Welfare departments power to remove children of AFDC mothers ‘with 
multiple instances of illegitimacy.’”262 Before cases such as King v. Smith (1969), caseworkers 
dropped by unannounced and rifled through closets and drawers looking for signs of a man in 
the house.  According to Ruby Duncan, 
Investigators would investigate your home.  They would bust in, knock on your door at 
midnight and bust in.  They were all up in your closet, all under your bed, everywhere, 
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and you wondered what the world is going on.  Your children are being 
frightened…That’s why a lot of women began pulling together and saying this has got to 
stop.263  
 
 The “sturdy beggar” was not alone in disparaging welfare recipients.  Maurice Davie in 
Negros in American Society (1949) described the “black bogeywoman.”  “[The] black mother 
spent grocery money on movies and dance halls, where she met men with whom she could 
easily have sex.  She produced legions of unwanted children, on whom she took out her 
frustrations.”264  As Emma Stampley, a poor black woman from the South, argued, “I would 
have preferred to have fewer children, but there wasn’t any birth control on the market for 
black peoples like they had for whites.  There was no place to go.”265  Despite its popular 
reputation as a moral wasteland that defied America’s traditional religious values, Las Vegas 
was a tough place for women to practice birth control.  As a Catholic, Stampley’s doctor refused 
to provide her with contraception.  Even after Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), a Catholic- and 
Mormon-dominated Nevada made it difficult for married women to obtain contraception 
advice and devices; unwed women had to wait until 1973.  Married women also needed their 
husband’s consent to have their tubes tied.266   
 In A Profile of the Negro American (1964) Thomas Pettigrew blamed black women for 
breaking up families, claiming they drove away husbands and damaged the self-esteem of their 
sons.  Hence the matriarch ruled the roost.  Later, the emasculated boys turned to violence to 
prove their manhood.  So it was Ruby Duncan who defied the prejudiced view of the 
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“bogeyman,” the racist myth of the “black bogeywoman” and Nevada’s political ritual of 
patronage, when she demanded relief.    
Welfare Rights Movement 
What they want from Legal Services is our best advice.  They don’t come here for me to tell them they 
don’t have the capacity to do something.  They can make their own assessment as to whether they can 
do it. 
—Jack Anderson, 1973 
 
  “Protests in the streets, and negotiations in the suites,” emphasizes Orleck, “were two 
arms of NWRO’s strategy for reforming the welfare system.”267  The National Welfare Rights 
Organization (NWRO), with legal advisor none other than former MFY director Ed Sparer, 
sought to establish a guaranteed minimum income and eliminate the punitive and humiliating 
regulations of welfare.  According to Orleck, law students, influenced by Sparer’s ideas, went on 
to “blaze new legal paths in the fields of domestic violence, immigration, women’s rights, 
health and consumer care, and the rights of the elderly.”268  Many joined the legal services 
programs surfacing across the nation to address the poor’s immediate needs.   
 In 1969, in response to Nevada’s continued reluctance to provide social services for the 
poor, Ruby Duncan and a group of Westside mothers formed the Clark County Welfare Rights 
Organization (CCWRO), a chapter of the NWRO.  That same year, according to historian Eugene 
Moehring, "continued segregation in area grade schools, coupled with a relative lack of city and 
state funding for Westside poverty programs, led to a full-scale riot." 269 At the time, most black 
residents including Ruby Duncan lived in West Las Vegas, where the rioting began.  The CCWRO 
had formed at a critical time, just as the tide of national politics turned against the poor. 
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Governors Nelson Rockefeller in New York and Ronald Reagan in California were currently 
investigating welfare fraud and cutting benefits respectively.  In 1970, Nevada welfare 
administrator George Miller abruptly reduced more than half of the grants going to women and 
children receiving welfare.  According to legal aid attorney Jack Anderson, “prior to this 
action…CCRWO had not grown a great deal…But this was war!”270  CCLS Director Mahlon Brown 
agreed to help Ruby Duncan and to represent every family cut off the welfare rolls.  Brown 
hired Anthony Diamond and fellow Howard Law school graduate Jack Anderson (paid for by the 
“Reggie” program), to deal with the flood of termination notices.   CCLS filed a class action suit 
in Federal District Court, Woods v. Miller (1970).  Despite a Temporary Restraining Order, Miller 
continued terminations.271  According to Anderson, Mrs. Duncan and the CCWRO responded by 
organizing a “campaign such as Nevada had never seen, the NWRO…declared Nevada a welfare 
battleground.”272 With hundreds of people accessing CCLS, Anderson and Brown forged 
Operation Nevada, “a legal assault on Nevada in the courts, combined with a series of carefully 
targeted mass protests designed to bring the state’s economy and government to its knees.”273  
The Operation involved an emergency “lawyers brigade” of approximately 40 lawyers and 70 
law students led by Ed Sparer.  Ronnie Pollack, a lawyer in Goldberg v. Kelly, signed on as co-
counsel for Woods.  The legal team assisted with requests for hundreds of fair hearings.  They 
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created a logjam by holding 72 hearings a day, lasting 15 minutes long.  Then began the mass 
protests,   
Hundreds of organizers, legal services attorneys, law students and sympathizers poured 
into Nevada.  Ruby Duncan, with Dr. Wiley, Ralph Abernathy, Jane Fonda, Florence 
Kennedy, Gloria Steinem and David Dellinger at her side, led thousands of protestors on 
a march down the Las Vegas Strip in March 1971.  [Other famous people included, actor 
Donald Sutherland, United Farm Workers leader Cesar Chavez, and Dr. Benjamin Spock.]  
The Casinos which had never closed came to a standstill when hundreds of poor women 
and children decided to stage eat-ins.274   
 
Duncan used local television to chastise liberal Democratic Governor Mike O’Callaghan for his 
“lack of concern” over the 7,500 Nevada welfare recipients hurt by welfare cuts.   
 Targeted protests by CCWRO, with the help of NWRO and CCLS, led to national media 
coverage which put pressure on Nevada’s Welfare division.275 According to Franciscan Father 
Louis Vitale, the first priest to be arrested in Nevada, “The city was supposed to be an escape 
for people.  They didn’t want to come all the way here and be reminded of all the problems of 
the 60s and 70s.  They didn’t want to face the question of the poor, and blacks.”276 Shortly after 
the march, Judge Roger D. Foley ruled the welfare cuts illegal, and all recipients were 
reinstated.  According to Mahlon Brown, “It established citizens’ rights to fair hearings in 
conflicts with government agencies across the US…from employment security to motor vehicles 
it spread across the country.”277 In response to the ruling, Miller and O’Callaghan increased 
their scrutiny of welfare fraud.  Conservatives in the Nevada assembly pushed for legislation 
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that would imprison, for up to ten years, without parole, those engaging in welfare fraud.278  
The legislation smacked of the Poor Laws, the “sturdy beggar” and the days of imprisoning the 
poor.   
 Operation Nevada was the last major initiative for Welfare Rights in Nevada.  Realizing 
that economic, political and legal power could not be separated, Duncan and CCWRO applied 
for grants to create a program that effectively addressed the physical and social deterioration 
of the Westside.  The program offered services for the poor such as daycare, job training, 
medical clinics, a variety of counseling, and free breakfasts for children; Mahlon Brown 
suggested the name “Operation Life”.279 
 CCLS continued to work with CCWRO throughout the 1970s.  In 1971, CCLS filed a class 
action against the Clark County School District (CCSD) to force participation in the National 
School Lunch Act.  In 1972, Anderson successfully represented Duncan and other Westside 
mothers on felony charges after they staged “eat-ins” at the Stardust hotel.280  In 1973, CCLS 
helped Operation Life (OL) secure the Old Cove Hotel to house their services.  Notably, CCLS 
had grown to fourteen employees, including four attorneys and two VISTA attorneys.  In April 
1973, after prodding from Governor O’ Callaghan, the state legislature finally passed a bill to 
fund its share of the federal food stamp program, making Nevada the last state to do so.281  
That same year OL opened a Community Health Center, with physicians, nurses, dentists, and 
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optometrists providing healthcare for children.282  OL also worked to establish the West Las 
Vegas library, and in 1974 brought the first Women, Infants and Children (WIC) program to 
Nevada.   
 During the Mahlon Brown and Jack Anderson period, Operation Life, with help from 
CCLS, gave the community food, medical care, a library and a community center. The program 
had fought for food stamps, WIC, job training, public service employment, the right to Medicaid 
benefits on jobs without medical coverage and more.  Through a number of appeals, CCLS had 
managed to overturn client disqualifications from AFDC benefits in Miller v. Munger (1972) and 
Parson v. Miller (1974); as well as, establish prorated benefits between the Aid to the Blind 
program and AFDC in Miller v. West (1972), and secure unemployment benefits after wrongful 
terminations in Lellis v. Archie, (1973).283  In 1974 Mahlon Brown III became a Justice of the 
Peace, and later served as a US Attorney for Nevada.   
 By 1976, LSC on a national scale had taken over the OEO-LSP responsibility of funding 
legal services programs.  That same year CCLS divided into specialty units to offer services 
through a senior law project, a lawyer referral service, a welfare law unit, and housing and 
consumer sections.  Notable litigation cases at the time involved wrongful seizure of a tenant’s 
property, Adams v. Sanson Inv. Co. (1974), pretrial detention conditions, Bishop v. State of 
Nevada (1976), attempts to block welfare cuts, Coby v. Miller (1977), and a revision to asset 
requirements for welfare eligibility in Brey v. Miller. 
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 Ruby Duncan served as Operation Life’s Executive Director until 1990.  She successfully 
brought in tens of millions of federal dollars to Nevada through: WIC, EPSDT, food stamps and 
other economic development grants.  Duncan also served as Vice Chair of the Clark County 
Democratic Party, which gave her critical access to Governor O’Callaghan, Harry Reid, Howard 
Cannon, State Senator Floyd Lamb and other Democratic luminaries. In addition, President 
Carter appointed her to his National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity in 1979.  
Together, CCLS and Duncan represented the poor, but not in the traditional sense; this time the 
poor found the venues available to articulate their needs and make their own demands.  CCLS, 
like so many other legal services programs in the 1970s, "promoted the distinctive treatment of 
the poor by state" by helping to turn poverty into "an officially sanctioned, routinely 
administered legal status."284 
 Another program that emerged in the 1970s, the Nevada Indian Legal Services (NILS), 
helped provide legal assistance to Native Americans.  According to AnnaMarie Johnson, “When 
[President] Johnson included the idea of free legal assistance for the poor…Native Americans 
were probably the segment of the population with the greatest poverty and the greatest lack of 
access to justice.”285  Incorporated in March 1973, NILS began providing legal services for Tribal 
members.  Until that time, none of the federal money Indians received was for legal aid.  
Nevada Indian Legal Services 
When I leave an Indian Community I nearly always leave depressed. —Dr. William Carmack286 
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 Self-determination for Indians began well before President Nixon’s message on Indian 
policy reform in 1970.  The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which incorporated significant 
portions of the US Bill of Rights to Indians and their lands, and the Indian Self-Determination 
and Education Assistance Act of 1975, which administered funds and grants to Indian tribes, 
were responses to the Indian unity movement that included rising Indian activism in the 1960s.  
Some Indians, like other minority groups, habitually fought white assimilation—they fought for 
identity.  The vicious circle of racism, harassment, unemployment, and underground attempts 
to escape poverty economically, via illegal trade, or psychologically via addiction, were both 
producers and products of poverty.  Native Americans were pushed onto reservations that 
could not sustain their earlier ways of life nor provide a life without poverty. 
 At the time, the Nevada Indian Agency managed federal Indian money and 
expenditures, but Nevada Governor Paul Laxalt wanted control of all federal funds in his state.   
At Lake Tahoe in 1969, the National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO) held a Federal-State 
Indian Affairs Conference.  Chair of the NCIO, Vice President Spiro Agnew, was also the newly 
appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs.  Laxalt submitted his proposal to make state 
agencies responsible for managing federal funds.  He argued against the Indian Agency, which 
managed a payroll of approximately $750,000 annually.  It was his position that the agency was 
“accounting for far too great a share of the tax dollar appropriated for the Indian.”287  
 Considering Nevada’s conservative stance on welfare at the time (as Ruby Duncan and 
so many others experienced), having state control over Indian money seemed self-defeating.  
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“In my State, the Indians are opposed to an attempt by a State to assume jurisdiction on Indian 
Affairs,” said John Rainer of New Mexico.  “We hear recognition of the Indian problems in the 
States of Arizona and Utah and New Mexico and other places, but I have not heard one 
delegate saying that the State is willing to spend a dollar to cure these problems.”288   
 In 1973, Charles Zeh, Executive Director of the Washoe County Legal Aid Society 
(WCLAS), created Nevada Indian Legal Services (NILS).  Located in Carson City, the new program 
fell under the umbrella of WCLAS.  At the time, WCLAS received federal grants from LSP, CETA 
(the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act), and money from Washoe County filing fees 
from civil cases.  According to Zeh, his work began when he signed up with the Reno Indian 
Athletic Association to play fast-pitch softball.  He described his involvement as a “feet on the 
ground” affair:  by being in the company of fellow sportsmen, their friends and families, he 
began to hear of the many legal problems facing Nevada Indians. As an attorney he felt 
fortunate to be able to help with divorces, repossessions, landlord tenant problems, and other 
legal issues.289   With no state funds in Nevada to help Indians, NILS provided legal aid with 
grants from LSP and then LSC.  The Indian program operated for only nine years before LSC 
forced a merger.  
The Merger 
 The LSC Act of 1974 provided three programs in Nevada with federal funds for legal 
services, Clark County Legal Services (CCLS), Washoe Legal Services (WLS), and NILS.290 Don 
Pope, who started as a VISTA volunteer in 1973, served as the next Executive Director of 
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NILS.291  Current Justice of the Peace and former Reno Mayor Pete Sferrazza continued Zeh’s 
and Pope’s work as director from 1976 to 1978, followed by Fred Lee as director in 1979 until 
the program’s merger.292  Just prior to the merger and in response to LSC funding for rural 
populations, NILS changed its name to Nevada Indian-Rural Legal Services (NIRLS) in 1981.  That 
year—Reagan’s first year in office—LSC officials chose to visit Nevada and inspect the LSC-
funded programs.  During their “visit”, LSC charged NIRLS program officials with poor 
management and use of LSC funds.  Based on an account by Carolyn Worrell (an LSC grant 
manager at the time), LSC received multiple complaints from NIRLS’s staff.  Worrell emphasized 
how inadequate funds limited the basic core of services and stifled the program. At the time, 
LSC officials were pushing states into consolidating organizations with the idea that centralized 
administration would be cost effective—Reagan’s 25% cut in funding for FY1982 was fast 
approaching.  In a separate visit to the CCLS program, LSC uncovered a history of “financial 
irregularities” from the office bookkeeper.  Without Director N.N. Singh’s knowledge, large 
amounts of money were unaccounted for.  With added operational control and the power to 
require reports, record keeping, and financial audits of grantees, LSC established ample illegal 
activity at CCLS, and unsatisfactory management at NIRLS—giving Reagan’s appointees the 
leverage they needed to consolidate the two programs.  Why wasn’t WLS forced to merge?  
“The regional office didn’t have the goods on them,” recalled Worrell.293  So evidently, unable 
to find fault with WLS, the Reagan-packed board of LSC decided the merger would have to 
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happen without them.  Sasser described LSC’s stick-first-then-carrot approach.  “Merge or else, 
we are going to basically fire all of you,” recalls Sasser, “pull all the money out from your boards 
and put together another program.”294 LSC then encouraged the deal by offering additional 
money from a state support grant.295  The merger allowed the new regional office to utilize 
Indian money to service the rural non-Indian population and expand its coverage of legal 
services.  At the time of the merger, only the Indian office covered the rural areas:  this included 
all Nevada counties except for Washoe and Clark, which were served by WLS and CCLS 
respectively.296  (Due to geography, CCLS also served Nye County).     
 Described as a “shotgun” wedding, in 1982, CCLS and NIRLS merged to become a new 
statewide program, Nevada Legal Services.297 
Nevada Legal Services    
Our goal at Nevada Legal Services is obviously to assist our clients in the best manner possible and 
provide the highest quality of legal services that we can. 
—Rhea Gertken, NLS Directing Attorney, 2014  
 
 NLS began just as President Reagan’s cutbacks hit legal services programs across the 
nation.  By now, LSC had shifted the focus of the earlier LSP from quality to one of observation 
and training.  It was evident that the “strings attached to federal funding under the Legal 
Services Program were minor compared to LSC’s oversight.”298  Ironically, with the new state 
support grant, NLS was one of the few programs to operate with increased funding.  Carolyn 
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Worrell, who had headed LSC’s Quality Improvement Program in Washington D.C., became the 
first Executive Director.299 She used the state support grant to hire Sasser as the Coordinator of 
Litigation and Training and staff attorneys John Morrell and future Nevada Supreme Court 
Justice Michael Douglas for the new program.300 
 As a statewide program, NLS formed task forces in public benefits, housing and Indian 
law.  Did the new merger hurt the access to justice for Native Americans?  According to NIRLS 
staff attorney Dick Olson the merger involved many heated board meetings.  The hard-core 
Indian law staff was very concerned that the services to Indians and tribal organizations would 
suffer; especially considering the size disparity between CCLS, which was larger and more 
powerful than the smaller Indian Legal program.  “The LSC was bludgeoning all programs into 
consolidating,” stated Olson, “LSC wanted one program per state to deal with.”301 Staff 
concerns were not unfounded:  NIRLS’ Winnemucca and Elko offices were closed down, leading 
to a reduction in services.  According to Worrell, the merger benefitted Nevada Indians.  She 
explained that “with the larger program, the administrative costs are shared, which means 
more resources can go into services; …absolutely, I think the merger increased services.”302 NLS 
did keep an Indian Law component, but as Kim Robinson, an NLS staff attorney for the Indian 
Law Project, added “what was lost in the process was the board of directors which was made 
                                                          
299
 The growing LSC bureaucracy’s push for consolidation and “professionalization” did, however, make it easier for 
new public interest attorneys to learn the practice. LSC and programs themselves offered training in family, 
consumer, employment, and other areas of law.  New lawyers acquired litigation skills in state and federal courts, 
while paralegals and support staff learned how to advocate for the poor via community education in public 
assistance, housing, and more.  Attorneys received manuals and training guides to advance their knowledge.  One 
of LSC’s programs the Quality Improvement Project or QIP produced video tapes for programs to use in training.  
QIP also offered grants to programs with innovative ideas.  One such grant went to NILS.   
300
 Justice Douglas also served as a directing attorney of the office, followed by Ray Rodgriguez, Justin Clouser, and 
Ruth Herch.   
301
 Interview with Dick Olson by Todd Ashmore, July 9, 2015. 
302
 Interview with Carolyn Worrell by Todd Ashmore, April 16, 2015. 
119 
 
up of people who were trying to direct the program to meet the local needs of the 
Indians…now we have maybe one Native American on the statewide board.”303 Currently, NLS 
has no Native American on its board.   
 After the merger, with shared overhead and added resources, the statewide program 
secured many favorable changes in the rules and regulations of the institutions and agencies 
their clients relied upon.  Although the Reagan board soon moved to restrict these activities, it 
was still possible for programs such as NLS to actively engage the Nevada legislature.  Based on 
Sasser’s account, 
The program was instrumental in having benefit levels for the Aid to Dependent 
Children program raised from a low of $199 a month for a family of three in 1983 to 
$348 by 1992.  In 1985, major revisions to the Landlord/Tenant Act and legislation 
authorizing Pro Se TROs in domestic violence cases were passed.  In 1987 uniform 
standards and judicial review for county medically indigent programs were enacted.  
1989 saw the creation of the Low Income Housing Trust Fund and the defeat of a bill to 
overturn the Newkirk decision.304 
  
NLS also engaged in a number of class actions which struck down excessive public housing 
charges and rent (Brown v. Housing Authority of the City of Las Vegas & Ortiz v. Housing 
Authority of the City of Las Vegas), secured welfare benefits of recipients involved in personal 
injury settlements (Johnson v. Nevada State Welfare Division), prevented automatic denial of 
general assistance to those deemed “employable” (Clark County Social Serv. Dep't v. Newkirk), 
and blocked general cuts in ADC benefits (Adams v. Griepentrog).  Taking test cases to the 
Nevada Supreme Court, NLS lawyers expanded due process for housing tenants facing summary 
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eviction.305  The Nevada Supreme Court also favorably settled case-by-case appeals involving 
unemployment compensation.306 
 In 1985, Worrell handed leadership over to Wayne Pressel, the second Executive 
Director of NLS.  During the 1970s and 1980s, many distinguished Nevadans served on the NLS 
board, including Nevada Supreme Court Justices Bill Maupin, Michael Cherry and Nancy Becker, 
as well as Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge, Johnnie Rawlinson. 
 According to Sasser, for the first half of the 1990s, NLS continued to make “significant 
progress in the courts, the legislature and in community advocacy.”307  In the early 1990s, the 
organization enjoyed a number of victories.   
In 1991, the Low Income Housing Trust Fund was created using an increase of 10 cents 
for each $500 of value in the real estate transfer tax, which in SFY ’08 generated $13.3 
million.  Also, the largest ADC increase was passed raising the grant temporarily to $367 
per month…The Governor was persuaded to veto a bill allowing evictions with 3 day 
notice from weekly tenants…The 1993 legislature required that 15% of redevelopment 
authority funds in Las Vegas be set aside for low income housing.308 
 
These achievements in the 1980s and 1990s exemplify why restrictions on lobbying are so 
detrimental to the poor.   
 Successful class action suits required the Welfare Division to make decisions on ADC and 
Medicaid applications within 45 days, (Hamilton, et al. v Griepentrog, et al.), raised a 
reasonable defense that vocational schools failed to offer meaningful educations to student 
loan recipients, (Hernandez, et al. v. Alexander, et al. ), forced libraries to accept homeless 
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patrons (Southern Nevada Homeless Coalition v. Clark County Library Board), and successfully 
sued a large landlord for locking tenants out without due process (Meyer v. Eighth Judicial 
District Court).  NLS also took appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court to successfully argue that 
disqualification from unemployment compensation due to misconduct must be based on an 
element of wrongfulness, Kolnik v. The Nevada Empl. Sec. Dept. (1996), and there was a right of 
appeal from summary eviction notices, Lippis v. Peters (1996).  Some of the examples proved 
that case-by-case successes can also change the law to benefit Nevada’s poor population as a 
whole.   
“Spin-off” 
 The last year NLS could lobby and bring class actions on behalf of the poor was 1995.  
“That’s when we, in Nevada restructured legal services so that CCLS and WLS would have no 
LSC money,” Wayne Pressel recalled, “to insulate a couple of the established organizations to 
do reform work.”309  Effective January 1, 1996, in response to increased restrictions, CCLS, like 
other programs across the nation, “spun off” its LSC-funded program.310  NLS staff member 
Barbara Buckley, who successfully ran for the Nevada Assembly and later served as the first 
female speaker, became the Executive Director of CCLS the following year.  What began as a 
legal aid society in 1958 would continue on as CCLS in 1996 and later become the Legal Aid 
Center of Southern Nevada [2008], with NLS giving CCLS rights to the civil filing fee money in 
order to fund them.  According to Pressel,  
that was my major career decision in legal services…I virtually gutted Nevada Legal 
Services and gave the guts to Barbara…and I would stay with the dead-imperiled half- 
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living, walking dead...She took the best lawyers, all the equipment, took the library, took 
all the machines, took anything she wanted, and let me do the rest.  She was going to do 
reform work.311  
 
 By the year 2000, NLS had operated for four years, adjusting to major LSC restrictions.  
NLS had two main offices in Las Vegas and Carson City, as well as two lawyers in Reno.  Carson 
City handled outreach and rural cases in Northern Nevada.  The offices closed a combined 476 
cases.  The majority of cases involved either Brief Service or Counsel and Advice (CNA), with 
approximately 54 percent housing, 21 percent income maintenance and 10 percent consumer 
issues.  NLS provided a multitude of services in categories such as housing, (mostly dealing with 
Federal Subsidized Housing or landlord/tenant), income maintenance, (mostly involving SSI, 
Unemployment Compensation and Food Stamps), consumer, (predominately involving 
collections, repossessions and garnishments), family, (involving mostly divorce, separation or 
annulments), health, (Medicaid), and miscellaneous issues (including wills and estates, and 
Indian/Tribal law).312 Clearly, the depth and quality of service had been affected.  After 1996, 
the majority of cases involved only brief service and advice.    
 In 2000 NLS expanded its services by adding a Self-Help Center (at the Clark County 
Family Court) and a Tenant’s Rights Center.  In 2003, NLS opened an office in Reno, and a 
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satellite workplace in Elko.  Thanks largely to Las Vegas, between 2000 and 2010 Nevada led the 
nation in growth, as its population soared 35 percent from 2 million to 2.7 million people.  
Nevada added its second congressional seat in 1983, a third in 2003, and a fourth in 2010.   
During the decade, NLS grew in response to Nevada’s economic growth and the flood of new 
residents, including many impoverished migrants seeking employment.  NLS dealt with a tide of 
clients as it responded to Nevada’s population “boom” and a greater wave of clients after an 
unforeseen “bust”.     
Boom and Bust  
 In the 1970s environmental historian Donald Worster warned of an American ethos 
that bred unbridled optimism.313  The ethos stemmed from an upward mobile society bent 
on the inevitability of progress and “getting ahead”.  In a laissez-faire market, without a 
check on this ethos, disasters such as the Dust Bowl, speculations such as the Dotcom 
“bubble,” and economic recessions and depressions were unavoidable.314 
 Just as the dotcom recession was ending, a widespread and overly optimistic 
perception of home values based on an unrealistic view of America’s future, created a 
housing “bubble.”  Peaking in 2006, the bubble collapsed, spawning a credit crisis.  As a 
result, the nation plummeted into a severe recession from 2007 to 2009.   Harvard’s State of 
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the Nation Housing report (funded by the Ford Foundation) summarized the subprime 
mortgage debacle that inflated the bubble, 
 In the hope of higher returns, lenders extended credit to borrowers previously unable to 
qualify for loans. Subprime mortgages rose from only 8 percent of originations in 2003 to 20 
percent in 2005 and 2006, while the interest-only and payment-option share shot up from 
just 2 percent in 2003 to 20 percent in 2005.315 
 
Predatory lenders offered interest-only and balloon payment mortgages, which saddled 
borrowers with expensive and inflated mortgages.316  The cycle of relaxed lending increased 
the supply of borrowers, which increased demand and artificially drove house prices upward.  
Overpriced housing with stagnant pay scales and general wages left many borrowers “house 
poor”, with little to no money left after making their monthly mortgage payments.  Thus the 
general economy suffered. Predatory lending left the state of economy unsustainable.317   
 The collapse of the housing bubble hit Nevadans especially hard.  One article mused 
that the desert metropolis of Las Vegas suddenly found itself underwater.  According to an 
article in the American Bankruptcy Journal, “Filings in Nevada increased at a faster rate than in 
nearly every other state from 2006-10 (+446 percent).”318 As historian Eugene Moehring 
observed, by the Spring of 2009 “land values valley-wide had crashed, falling by 74 percent 
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from their all-time high just a few years earlier.”319  By May 2010 Nevada’s unemployment rate 
reached a high of 14.2 percent.  The Las Vegas Review-Journal reported that Nevada led the 
nation in unemployment. As Chief Economist with the state Department of Employment, 
Training and Rehabilitation, Bill Anderson noted, “If you’d asked me two years ago, when 
Nevada had essentially been the fastest-growing state in the nation for two decades running, 
one couldn’t have imagined that things would deteriorate this far.”320  LSC’s 2009 Justice Gap 
revealed the problems legal services programs such as NLS were seeing; “the current economic 
crisis, with its attendant problems of high unemployment, home foreclosures and family stress, 
has resulted in legal problems relating to consumer credit, housing, employment, bankruptcies, 
domestic violence and child support, and has pushed many families into poverty for the first 
time.”321  According to a report by UNLV’s Center of Democratic Culture, 
In 2009, about 3% of the Clark County population (52,458 people) was homeless at 
some time during the year. 85% of mortgage holders in Las Vegas have negative equity 
in their homes.  Housing permits in Southern Nevada have dropped from a peak of 
39,012 permits in 2005 to a 30-year low of 5,734 in 2009. Some 40% of Nevadans are 
renters, ranking the state 47th in the nation.322 
 
Just as Donald Worster warned over thirty years earlier, if left unchecked, the American ethos 
would lead to economic disasters and environmental catastrophes.  Countless foreclosures left 
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backyard pools in Las Vegas green with algae—at a time when the West Nile Virus was declared 
endemic.323  
 Unemployment greatly increased Las Vegas’ poor population, forcing NLS to work 
harder than ever.  In 2000 it closed 476 cases; by 2010 the number jumped to 7,681 cases.  The 
greatest shift in casework involved private landlord/tenant issues.  In 2000 landlord/tenant 
represented 23.5 percent of NLS casework; by 2005 it rose to 30.9 percent.  In 2009 
landlord/tenant amounted to 58.1 percent of casework, and rose to 60.3 percent by 2010.  
Interestingly, the rise in landlord/tenant issues in 2005 can be attributed to the economic 
boom.  In 2005, the unemployment rate hit a low of 3.9 percent.  With employment comes 
more demand for rental housing.  This demand pushes rents higher, which leads to increased 
evictions for the poor; oftentimes unlawfully.   The demand and pricing for rent typically drops 
during economic slumps, but this was not the case in Nevada, much less in Las Vegas.  Indeed, 
the housing crisis pushed many previous homeowners onto the “renters” market.  NLS 
therefore dealt with an even greater number of landlord/tenant issues.    In 2007, 8.5 percent 
of cases involved divorce and separation, becoming NLS’s third top issue.  Unemployment 
Compensation (6.9 percent) and collections/repossessions/garnishments (4.0 percent) reached 
the top third and fifth spots respectively in 2009. By 2010, Unemployment Compensation 
accounted for 7.5 percent of casework, while collections totaled 3.2 percent.  
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We Do What We Can 
 NLS celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2012.  NLS merged at a time when the state’s 
entire population was less than 600,000; by 2012, about 2 million people lived in the Las Vegas 
Valley alone.  NLS grew in response to Nevada’s population of impoverished residents in need 
of legal services.  According to the 2010 census, 41% of Nevadans were living at poverty levels.  
“Between 2008 and 2012,” AnnaMarie Johnson recalled that “we went from a staff of 29 to a 
staff of 45.”324  In response, NLS offered a multitude of programs to serve all seventeen 
counties of the state as well as specific populations:  the Indian Law Project served 23 Indian 
reservations; the Low Income Taxpayer Clinic helped clients with IRS tax issues, (most 
surprisingly, Nevada had the highest number of Pro Se litigants in tax court in the nation); NLS 
also revived its Pro Bono Program in 2008.325  During her 30th anniversary presentation, NLS 
Executive Director Johnson reiterated the need for legal services in Nevada,  
We do what we can…We lost some LSC funding in 2012…but we’re tightening our belt 
and getting by…we’re doing what we can through our direct representation and through 
all of the various programs and clinics that we have, but still the need is great.326 
 
 In the sense that access to justice means providing an attorney for a client, NLS 
attorneys and advocates have, from 2000 to present, handled well over 61,000 cases, helping 
over 136,000 household members.  They have also provided services for over 1.3 million people 
with non-case matters.327  Since NLS revived its Pro Bono program in 2008, over 1,612 cases 
                                                          
324
 LSC Presentation, directed by Nevada Legal Services, 2012, video. 
325
 Pro Bono programs maximize services through recruitment of private attorneys.  In an interview Jon Sasser 
described the benefit: “if you got a couple million bucks, you can only hire so many lawyers, but if you take one of 
those people and their job is to recruit  private attorneys to also help poor people, and you take some more money 
and you setup self-help clinics then you can help more.  Basically, it’s just another way of getting more “bang for 
your buck.” Interview with Jon Sasser by Todd Ashmore , March 13, 2014. 
326
 LSC Presentation, directed by Nevada Legal Services, 2012, video. 
327
 Issues may involve casework or non-case matters.  In July 2001, grantees began collecting information on non-
case matters, which included community legal education, Pro Se assistance, referrals, and outreach.  This involved 
128 
 
have been accepted.  NLS recovered approximately $7.75 million for clients through help with 
probate, divorce, bankruptcy, costs associated with a private attorney, and other benefits.  
Notable cases by NLS involved clarifying Native American rights in In re Phillip A.C. (2006), and 
State Engineer v. S. Fork Band of the Te-Moak Tribe (2000), reinterpreting unemployment 
compensation in favor of those disabled on the job, Anderson v. State Employ. Sec. Div. (2014), 
and enforcing legitimate SSI claims, Bohland v Barnhart, (2002). 
Employees   
 The NLS-related cases mentioned, required the efforts of attorneys Raymond Rodriguez, 
Jon Sasser, David Olshan, Barbara Buckley, Dan Wulz, Jordan Savage, and Heather Anderson-
Fintak, to name a few.  It is important to remember that NLS employees and employees of all 
legal services programs provide the service.  From the “Reggie” programs, back-up centers and 
legal aid programs across the nation employees who produced law reform and represented 
clients before the courts made the programs effective.  “Of all the decisions made by the 
director of the board of a local agency,” asserts Earl Johnson, “none ranks in importance with 
the selection of the staff attorneys—the operating personnel who deliver the service to the 
customer.”328  AnnaMarie Johnson, who began her role as Deputy Director of NLS in 2006, 
recognizes that a quality program requires a good staff.  “This is a truly wonderful staff that we 
have.  They’re dedicated, they’ve had the opportunity—I know there have been people out 
there trying to poach them away—but they stay and they do a great job.”329  Many outstanding 
attorneys choose public over corporate interest.  
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Access to Justice 
 Legal Services still plays an important role in combatting poverty.  As part of a network 
of legal services providers, LSC-funded programs comprise an integral part of today’s 
patchwork-way of providing a civil Gideon.  Nevertheless, a significant justice gap remains in 
the provision of civil legal services.  Federal funding involves regulation that ultimately limits 
the scope of client services.  NLS provides services that help the poor in their fight against 
poverty, but with LSC restrictions and regulations, it cannot provide them with the kind of 
access to justice envisioned at its inception.330 Do LSC restrictions limit access to justice?  “Yes,” 
responds Carolyn Worrell, “until a Legal Services attorney can provide the same kind of 
representation that private attorneys can, it does limit it.”331  When Justice Douglas began his 
work as a staff attorney for NLS in 1982, his goal was to provide legal resource for people who 
couldn’t afford an attorney, there were no restrictions.  “What does that do?” he asked, “It 
gives those individuals, full rights to citizenship.  If you’re in a position, where you can’t afford 
to attain an attorney, you’re not a full citizen, because what you have to do to defend yourself 
is deemed criminal in most cases.”332 
 Houseman and Perle spoke of a “diminished capacity” for legal services, but the real 
problem lies in the fact that without class action suits and legislative advocacy, NLS can never 
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prevent the practices and legislative acts that perpetuate poverty.  Oftentimes legal problems 
would best be answered by a class action suit, because the source of the problem affects 
multiple clients.  Without class actions and legislation that champions the poor, illegal business 
practices, harmful rules and regulations, slum lords and other factors will continue to exploit 
the poor.  Other conditions also narrow access.  “The restriction that by far had the most 
impact,” noted Worrell, “was denying the programs the ability to request attorney’s fees, 
because that frequently was a very important negotiating tool.  When we lost that, it was like 
one hand tied behind our back.”333 Court decisions frequently resulted in capped or limited 
monetary penalties.  By adding attorney’s fees, the cost of losing a case increased dramatically.  
Increased costs acted as a deterrent for opposing counsel—they had much more to lose.  Legal 
Services programs also benefitted from the additional funds earned by fee generating cases.334 
The culmination of restrictions on class actions, legislative advocacy, and attorney’s fees were 
exacerbated by restrictions on non-LSC funds.  According to Worrell, “Attorney’s fees restriction 
and the fact that the restrictions apply not just too legal services funding but to any funding 
that an LSC program receives…was a very heinous restriction.”335  The work CCLAS, CCLS and 
NLS did on reform prior to 1996 was more effective, held greater depth, and was more 
beneficial than just access to justice.  “The shift went from OEO, which was reform, to total 
access to justice meaning that we have legal aid, omnipresent, doing much less for everybody,” 
remarked Wayne Pressel, “You kind of went from being the Stanford ‘Think Tank’ for new 
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medical breakthroughs and made it into Medicare. So it had a value, but it's remembered, now 
it's Medicare.”336  
 Conservatives in Congress, attacks from the far right, the ABA’s willingness to concede, 
and LSC’s coercion, have made access to justice what it is today—a passing of responsibility to 
the private sector, narrowing of the passage to the courts, and restrictions that perpetuate 
poverty and injustice.  As Pressel observed, “back then, legal services would have been front 
and center in foreclosure work, we'd be front and center in equal pay for women, and front and 
center in minimum wage.”337   
Casualties of War 
“In every period, society makes some attempt to care for its weaker members.” ~ Lawrence Friedman, 
2005 
 When asked if he joined legal services to fight the War on Poverty, Justice Douglas 
replied, “No, I was there to provide legal representation for those who couldn’t, plain and 
simple.”338 He described his experience,  
People would come and see me…I’d say where are you living? They’d say I’m living in my 
car.  It was July; it was over 100 degrees out there.  So you have a man and a woman 
and their two small kids living in their damn car.   If you have any kind of sensibility, you 
realize their entitled to something.  I don’t think you have to start out as being a 
crusader, but if you believe people deserve a fair shot, yeah, it gets to you real quick. I 
didn’t start as a crusader; it became a crusade because of the injustices that were being 
done.339  
 
 There still exist leaders in Nevada who believe in the earlier initiatives of OEO; indeed, 
they are still fighting a war on poverty. Although the language has changed, former NLS 
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Executive Directors Worrell and Pressel, Executive Director of the Legal Aid Center of Southern 
Nevada, Barbara Buckley, and others such as Jon Sasser, Justice Douglas and Executive Director 
AnnaMarie Johnson each fight poverty in their own way.  “Part of the outrage over the 
restrictions,” argues Worrell, “is that Legal Services attorneys are frequently seen as Private 
Attorneys General…we help to enforce the law.”340     
Excuse me bad debt collection firm, you screw up and we’re going to come after you 
under the Fair Debt Collection Act which provides treble damages for clients and 
attorney’s fees for attorneys.  So when private attorneys won’t take those cases, then 
the legal services programs can and will.  And so again, it’s the Private Attorney General 
concept rather than talking about getting people out of poverty…Hopefully the end 
result is the same.   
 
Jon Sasser is currently involved in legislative advocacy, providing a voice for the poor during 
legislative sessions.  Barbara Buckley heads the Legal Aid Center, whose mission is “dedicated 
to providing civil legal services to the most vulnerable in our community.”  Johnson and her 
staff do what they can to provide the best legal services available.  Justice Douglas co-chairs the 
Access to Justice Commission, which works to coordinate legal services in the state. Pressel is 
now a private attorney, but his practice closely parallels legal services.  His work in foreclosure 
focuses on the long-term plan and ultimate wealth of the client.  Rather than keep clients in 
refinanced, overpriced, and underwater mortgages, Pressel suggests clients defer payments 
and put their mortgage money into savings.  Of course the client will lose their home, but not 
until Pressel forestalls the foreclosure process for years, giving his clients enough time to obtain 
a reasonably priced home with their savings.  The escape from being house-poor results in less 
debt, increased long-term wealth, and more money for a life plan.  In short, all these advocates 
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for the poor use the law to fight for clients in unemployment, housing and consumer cases, 
which ultimately becomes an extra-legal issue of money and quality of survival.   
 During their work with LSC-funded programs, these veterans of legal aid often came to 
loggerheads with the increased regulations.  Some continued working within the regulations as 
best they could, while others opted out of using LSC funds altogether.  Some fought the 
regulations and managed to skirt vague restrictions; some simply moved on; while others 
fought and lost.  Since 1969, all legal aid advocates have had to cope with budget cuts, 
restrictions, and other roadblocks to quality thrown up by staunch conservatives, many of 
whom have no fondness for legal aid.  The Nixon Administration worked to disband the OEO 
and eliminate law reform activities.  The Reagan Board managed to cut funding and successfully 
end the “Reggie” program.  The Republican Revolution bought an end to Support Centers in 
1996—the very centers designed to provide legal services—without which programs lacked 
training, dexterity and know-how to provide effective access to justice for the poor.   
 Eliminating successful and contentious leaders of legal aid on a national, state and local 
level was also an effective tactic in curtailing the value of legal services in general, a sort of 
culling of the herd, if you will.  Vice President Spiro Agnew forced the resignation of Fred 
Speaker.  Howard Phillips fired LSP Directors Terry Lezner and 1969 “Reggie” recipient Ted 
Tetzlaff, and Deputy Director Frank Jones.  On June 1, 1984, Marttie L. Thompson, Director of 
LSC’s regional office in Philadelphia resigned, citing “a ‘cumulative’ series of actions by the 
corporation’s management, which…hampered his effectiveness and harmed the ‘interest of the 
poor.’”341  Thompson simply grew tired of the way LSC treated legal aid programs, barring their 
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advocates from talking to news organizations and “raiding” programs’ budges and rummaging 
through their files in search of supposed misconduct.  How many others were fired or pressured 
to resign?  In 2008, Pressel was fired from NLS. 
Wayne Pressel 
 Used as a buzzword, “Manhattanization” described the burgeoning development of 
high-rises in Las Vegas.  During the boom, developers looked to promote their condo 
investments by locating them on or near Las Vegas Boulevard.  Close to downtown Fremont 
Street, the “condo craze” included projects such as the Juhl, Manhattan, Newport and Ogden.  
The land NLS occupied at 530 S. 6th St. was close enough to the Strip to be included in such a 
high-rise development.  In 2006, a developer approached NLS.  Realizing property values were 
extremely high, Pressel and the NLS board agreed to sell the building.  Unfortunately for the 
developer, an adjacent property included in the plan, was tied up in litigation.  The time needed 
to resolve the issue, required the developer to extend the contract with NLS.  Ultimately, after 
multiple extensions, NLS received a total of $300,000 in earnest money from a failed sale.  
Although the windfall went back into the NLS program, Pressel allocated the money as 
unrestricted non-LSC funds.  In response, LSC claimed he stole the money.  Pressel argued that 
the NLS building, which earned the earnest money, was originally purchased with non-LSC 
funds prior to 1995, so the money was not connected to an LSC source.    
 The collapse of the United States housing bubble and the ensuing Great Recession from 
December 2007 to June 2009 brought more scrutiny of U.S. government spending.  As a result, 
Congress closely watched the practices of LSC and its grantee-recipient programs across the 
nation.  The Office of Compliance and Enforcement (OCE) and the Office of Inspector General 
135 
 
reviewed and audited various grantees, including NLS, for compliance and performance.  In 
2008, prior to a full investigation into allegations of wrongdoing, members of LSC’s OCE held a 
meeting with NLS Board members.  With unsubstantiated claims, LSC transferred its pressure 
from Congress to NLS Board members.  With innuendos suggesting embezzlement, NLS board 
members terminated Executive Director Wayne Pressel.  Described by Pressel as a prolonged 
and expensive “witchhunt,” LSC investigated its own misappropriation of funds claim and found 
no monies unaccounted for.  After 23 years of service, without fanfare or salute, Pressel was 
unceremoniously fired from NLS, although no wrongdoing was ever found.  Clearly, the 
termination was politically motivated. 
 According to Pressel, his departure from Nevada Legal Services began much earlier 
when Congress started increasing restrictions in 1996.  Although at odds with the restrictions, 
Pressel stayed with NLS. As an attorney who supported the War on Poverty, he was reluctant to 
give up the fight and continued to look for ways to use restricted funding to help the poor. “I 
was always trying to slowly find ways out,” Pressel recalled, “And that's what really brought 
about my demise... [LSC] hated me when I was there. That was because I kept on pushing the 
limits.”  Pressel found ways to increase access to justice by using creative means to sidestep 
regulations,  
I would say that we could provide legal assistance without income determination 
because we were only providing counsel and advice, and there was a loophole that said 
that when you provided counsel and advice as opposed to brief service on a case that 
you didn't have to take an income determination.  So I set up this huge counsel and 
advice telephone system…just to circumvent… and it made them…crazy.342 
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Pressel, like other attorneys during the War on Poverty days, reminds us that the caring 
and dedication of those carrying the tattered banner of reform extends far beyond shuffling 
clients through the courts.  Access to justice meant something different; it meant equality for 
the poor among society. Pressel’s fervor for reform and his ultimate departure from legal 
services begs the question, without all of the government restrictions, how effective could NLS 
be in providing full equality rather than mere access to justice for the poor? 
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